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Abstract
The propagation of macroeconomic shocks through input-output and geographic networks
can be a powerful driver of macroeconomic uctuations. We rst exposit that in the presence
of Cobb-Douglas production functions and consumer preferences, there is a specic pattern of
economic transmission whereby demand-side shocks propagate upstream (to input-supplying
industries) and supply-side shocks propagate downstream (to customer industries) and that
there is a tight relationship between the direct impact of a shock and the magnitudes of the
downstream and the upstream indirect e¤ects. We then investigate the short-run propagation
of four di¤erent types of industry-level shocks: two demand-side ones (the exogenous compo-
nent of the variation in industry imports from China and changes in federal spending) and two
supply-side ones (TFP shocks and variation in knowledge/ideas coming from foreign patent-
ing). In each case, we nd substantial propagation of these shocks through the input-output
network, with a pattern broadly consistent with theory. Quantitatively, the network-based
propagation is larger than the direct e¤ects of the shocks. We also show quantitatively large
e¤ects from the geographic network, capturing the fact that the local propagation of a shock
to an industry will fall more heavily on other industries that tend to collocate with it across
local markets. Our results suggest that the transmission of various di¤erent types of shocks
through economic networks and industry interlinkages could have rst-order implications for
the macroeconomy.
JEL Classication: E32.
Keywords: economic uctuations, geographic collocation, input-output linkages, networks, propa-
gation, shocks.
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1 Introduction
How small shocks are amplied and propagated through the economy to cause sizable uc-
tuations is at the heart of much macroeconomic research. Potential mechanisms that have
been proposed range from investment and capital accumulation responses in real business cy-
cle models (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982), to Keynesian multipliers (e.g., Diamond, 1982,
Kiyotaki, 1988, Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987, Hall, 2009, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Re-
belo, 2011), to credit market frictions facing rms, households or banks (e.g., Bernanke and
Gertler, 1989, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2012, Mian and Su, 2013),
to the role of real and nominal rigidities and their interplay (Ball and Romer, 1990), and to
the consequences of (potentially inappropriate or constrained) monetary policy (e.g., Friedman
and Schwartz, 1971, Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, Farhi and Werning, 2013).
A class of potentially-promising approaches based on the spread of small shocks from rms
or disaggregated sectors through their economic and other links to other units in the economy
has generally been overlooked, however. The idea is simple. A shock to a single rm (or
sector) could have a much larger impact on the macroeconomy if it reduces the output of
not only this rm (or sector), but also of others that are connected to it through a network
of input-output linkages. The macroeconomic importance of this idea was downplayed by
Lucass (1977) famous essay on business cycles on the basis of the argument that if shocks
that hit rms or disaggregated sectors are idiosyncratic, they would then wash out when
we aggregate across these units and look at macroeconomic uctuations  due to a law of
large numbers-type argument. Despite this powerful dismissal, this class of approaches has
attracted recent theoretical attention. An important paper by Gabaix (2011) showed that
when the rm-size distribution has very fat tails, so that shocks hitting the larger rms cannot
be balanced out by those a¤ecting smaller rms, the law of large numbers need not apply,
opening the way to sizable macroeconomic uctuations from idiosyncratic rm-level shocks.1
Carvalho (2008), Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010, 2014), Acemoglu, Carvalho,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) and Baqaee (2015) built on the multi-sector framework rst
developed by Long and Plosser (1983) to show how input-output linkages can also neutralize the
force of the law of large numbers because shocks hitting sectors that are particularly important
as suppliers to other sectors will not wash out and can translate into aggregate uctuations.
One attractive aspect of these network-based approaches to the amplication and propaga-
tion of shocks is that they naturally lend themselves to an empirical analysis that can inform
the importance of the proposed mechanisms, and the current paper undertakes such an empir-
ical investigation. We are not the rst to empirically study these interactions. One branch of
1Earlier contributions on this theme include Jovanovic (1987) and Durlauf (1993) who showed how idiosyn-
cratic shocks can accumulate into aggregate risk in the presence of strong strategic complementarities, and Bak,
Chen, Scheinkman and Woodford (1993) who proposed a model of macroeconomic self-organized criticality
capable of generating macroeconomic uctuations from small shocks due to nonlinear interactions between rms
and industries.
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existing research has provided model-based quantitative evaluation of the importance of these
interactions (e.g., Horvath, 1998, 2000, Carvalho, 2008, Foerster, Sarte and Watson, 2011). A
number of recent papers have instead focused on observable large shocks to a set of rms or
industries and have traced their impact through the input-output network. Acemoglu, Autor,
Dorn, Hanson and Price (2015) do this focusing on the spread of the impact of increased Chi-
nese competition into the U.S. economy through input-output linkages and local labor markets,
though focusing on 10-year or 20-year e¤ects. Boehm, Flaaen and Nayar (2014), Barrot and
Sauvagnat (2014), and Carvalho, Nirei and Saito (2014) focus on the transmission of natural
disasters, such as the 2011 Japanese earthquake, over the global input-output network.2 Our
paper contributes to this literature by studying the spread of four di¤erent types of shocks
through the U.S. input-output network at business cycle frequencies. We also add to this by
evaluating the contribution of the geographic networkof industries  which measures the
collocation patterns of industries across di¤erent commuting zones  to the inter-industry
propagation of macroeconomic shocks.3
We begin by developing some theoretical implications of the propagation of shocks through
the input-output linkages. Most notably, theory predicts that supply-side (productivity) shocks
propagate downstream much more powerfully than upstream  meaning that downstream
customers of directly-hit industries are a¤ected more strongly than their upstream suppliers.
In contrast, demand shocks (e.g., from imports or government spending) propagate upstream
 meaning that upstream suppliers of directly hit industries are a¤ected more strongly than
their downstream customers. This pattern results from the fact that supply-side shocks change
the prices faced by customer industries, creating powerful downstream propagation, while
demand-side shocks have much more minor (or no) e¤ects on prices and propagate upstream
as a¤ected industries adjust their production levels and thus input demands. In the simplied
benchmark model studied in much of the literature, where both production functions and
consumer preferences are Cobb-Douglas (so that income and substitution e¤ects cancel out),
these e¤ects emerge particularly clearly: there is no upstream e¤ect from supply-side shocks
and no downstream e¤ect from demand-side shocks. In addition, we show that there is a
restriction on the quantitative magnitudes of the own e¤ect (measuring how a shock to an
industry a¤ects that industry) and the network e¤ects.
Our empirical work focuses on four di¤erent types of industry-level shocks, all propagating
through the input-output linkages at the level of 392 industries as measured by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis input-output tables. Our four shocks are: (1) variation from the exoge-
nous component of imports from China; (2) changes in federal government spending (a¤ecting
industries di¤erentially on the basis of their dependence on demand from the federal govern-
2Acemoglu, Akcigit and Kerr (2015) look at the medium-run spread of new ideas through the innovation
(knowledge-ow) network of the U.S. economy.
3Though our evidence shows that microeconomic (industry-level) shocks are important and propagate
strongly, it does not directly speak to the issues discussed in the previous paragraph, that is, to whether a
law of large numbers-type argument will ensure that they wash out at the macro level.
2
ment); (3) total factor productivity (TFP) shocks; and (4) knowledge/productivity stimuli
coming from variation in foreign industry patents. For each one of these shocks, we construct
downstream and upstream network e¤ects by using information from the input-output tables
 namely by taking the inner product of the corresponding row or column of the input-output
matrix with a vector of shocks at the industry level. We then estimate parsimonious models of
industry-level value added, employment and productivity growth on their own lags, an indus-
trys own shocks, and downstream and upstream e¤ects from shocks hitting other industries.4
A brief summary of our results is as follows. For each one of these four shocks, we nd
propagation through the input-output network to be statistically and economically important,
and broadly consistent with theory. In particular, for the two demand-side shocks  Chinese
imports and federal government spending  we nd that upstream propagation is substan-
tially stronger than downstream e¤ects, which are often zero or of opposite sign. In contrast,
for the two supply-side shocks  TFP and foreign patenting  there is strong downstream
propagation, and limited or no upstream e¤ects. In addition, the quantitative restrictions
between own e¤ects and network e¤ects implied by theory are often veried. We also nd the
general patterns to be quite robust to di¤erent weighting schemes, additional controls, longer
time scales, di¤erent lag structures, and so on.
The quantitative network e¤ects are sizable and typically larger than the quantitative
impact of own shocks. Figure 1a gives an indication of the magnitude of network e¤ects by
graphing the impulse response functions that result from a one-time one standard-deviation
shock to every manufacturing industry.5 The di¤erent panels show that network e¤ects are
more pronounced than own e¤ects. For example, one standard-deviation increase in imports
from China will have a direct (own) e¤ect of reducing value added growth by 3.46% in 10
years. Factoring in the (upstream) network e¤ects, the total impact of the same shock is a
22.1% decline in value added growth. This implies a sizable network multiplier(dened as
the size of the total impact relative to the direct impact of the shock) of 22:1=3:46 ' 6:4. The
implied employment multiplier is similar, approximately 5.9.
We nally consider the e¤ect of geographic collocation (overlay) of industries. The geo-
graphic overlay of industries reects the importance of localized networks, as industries with
4We should add at this point that despite our use of the term shocks, we would like to be cautious in
claiming that our estimates correspond to causal e¤ects of purely exogenous shocks on endogenous economic
outcomes. Even though we specify our regression equations to guard against the most obvious forms of endo-
geneity (contemporaneous shocks a¤ecting both left- and right-hand side variables and Manskis (1993) reection
problem that would result from having grouped endogenous variables on the right-hand side), our shocks them-
selves may be endogenous to economic decisions in the recent past. For imports from China, because we are
focusing on the exogenous component of the variation, we are fairly condent that our estimates are informative
about causal e¤ects. The same applies, perhaps with some additional caveats, to federal spending shocks, since
we exploit variation across industries in their di¤erential responsiveness to such aggregate changes. For the TFP
and foreign patenting measures, the endogeneity concerns are more severe. Nevertheless, even in these cases we
believe that our regressions are informative about the propagation of these pre-determined shocks through
the input-output and geographic networks.
5Here, consistent with theory, network e¤ects refer to downstream e¤ects for supply-side shocks and
upstream e¤ects for demand-side shocks. The details of how Figure 1 is constructed are provided below.
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substantial exchanges frequently locate near each other to reduce transportation costs and
facilitate information transfer (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).6 After deriving a
theoretically-motivated measure of how industry-level shocks should propagate through the
geographic overlay of industries, we show that geographic e¤ects add another dimension of
network-based propagation. While our main results are robust to these additional controls for
geographic patterns, which demonstrates that input-output networks are operating above-and-
beyond localized factors like regional business cycles, the geographic network also turns out
to be a powerful transmitter of shocks from one industry to others. In fact, even though our
estimates of the spread of shocks across collocating industries are slightly less robust than our
baseline results, the e¤ects appear quantitatively as large or even larger.
Overall, we interpret our results as suggesting that network-based propagation, particu-
larly but not exclusively through the input-output linkages, might be playing a sizable role in
macroeconomic uctuations, and certainly a more important one than typically presumed in
modern macroeconomics.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model on input-
output networks and shock propagation. Section 3 describes our data and provides descriptive
statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical results focusing exclusively on national input-output
connections, and Section 5 further adds in the geographic overlay. The last section concludes,
while Appendix A and Online Appendices B and C contain further results and omitted proofs.
2 Theory
In this section, we develop some simple theoretical implications of input-output linkages, and
then turn to a discussion of the macroeconomic consequences of the geographic concentration
of industries in certain areas.
2.1 Input-Output Linkages
We start with a model closely related to Long and Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu, Carvalho,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), which will clarify the role of input-output linkages.
Consider a static perfectly competitive economy with n industries, and suppose that each
industry i = 1; :::; n has a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
yi = e
zi li
li
nY
j=1
x
aij
ij : (1)
Here xij is the quantity of goods produced by industry j used as inputs by industry i, li is
labor, and zi is a Hicks-neutral productivity shock (representing both technological and other
6Recent work looking at the local coagglomeration of industries includes Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2010),
Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010), and Helsley and Strange (2014).
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factors a¤ecting productivity). We assume that, for each i, li > 0, and aij  0 for all j (where
aij = 0 implies that the output of industry j is not used as an input for industry i), and
li +
nX
j=1
aij = 1;
so that the production function of each industry exhibits constant returns to scale.7
As equation (1) makes clear, the output of each industry is used as input for other industries
or consumed in the nal good sector. Incorporating the demand from other industries, the
market-clearing condition for industry i can be written as
yi = ci +
nX
j=1
xji +Gi; (2)
where ci is nal consumption of the output of industry i, and Gi denotes government purchases
of good i, which are assumed to be wasted or spent on goods households do not directly care
about. We introduce government purchases to be able to model demand-side shocks in a simple
fashion.
The preference side of this economy is summarized by a representative household with a
utility function
u(c1; c2; :::; cn; l) = (l)
nY
i=1
c
i
i ; (3)
where i 2 (0; 1) designates the weight of good i in the representative households prefer-
ences (with the normalization
Pn
i=1 i = 1), and (l) is a decreasing (di¤erentiable) function
capturing the disutility of labor supply.
The government imposes a lump-sum tax, T , to nance its purchases. Denoting the price
of the output of industry i by pi, this implies T =
Pn
i=1 piGi. Since its income comes only
from labor, wl, the representative households budget constraint can be written as
nX
i=1
pici = wl   T:
We focus on the competitive equilibrium of this static economy, which is dened in the
usual fashion, so that all rms maximize prots and the representative household maximizes
7The main results we emphasize do not depend on the absence of physical capital, for example, with a
production function that takes the form
yi = e
zi li
lik
ki
i
nY
j=1
x
aij
ij :
We suppress capital to simplify the notation and discussion.
More consequential is our assumption that this is a static economy where each industry simultaneously buys
inputs from others. Long and Plosser (1983), instead, assumed that an industry at time t uses as inputs
products produced by other industries at date t  1. We discuss the implications of our timing assumption and
the robustness of our results to this structure in Appendix C, available online.
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its utility, in both cases taking all prices as given, and the market-clearing conditions for each
good and labor are satised. The amount of government spending and taxes are taken as given
in this competitive equilibrium. We also choose the wage as the numeraire (i.e., set w = 1).
The Cobb-Douglas production functions in (1), combined with prot maximization, imply
pjxij
piyi
= aij : (4)
In preparation for our main results we will present, let A denote the matrix of aijs,
A =
0BBBBB@
a11 a12 :::
a21 a22
. . .
ann
1CCCCCA :
We also dene
H (I A) 1 (5)
as the Leontief inverse of the input-output matrix A, and denote its typical entry by hij .
Proposition 1 The impact of sectoral productivity (supply-side) shocks on the output of sector
i is
d ln yi = dzi|{z}
own e¤ ect
+
nX
j=1
(hij   1j=i) dzj| {z }
network e¤ ect
; (6)
where hij is the ij-th element of H (the Leontief inverse of A), and 1j=i is the indicator
function for j = i. This equation implies that in response to productivity shocks, there are
no upstream e¤ects (i.e., no e¤ects on suppliers of a¤ected industries) and only downstream
e¤ects (i.e., only e¤ects on customers of a¤ected industries).
Suppose (l) = (1  l). Then the impact of government spending (demand-side) shocks on
the output of sector i is
d ln yi =
d ~Gi
piyi|{z}
own e¤ ect
+
nX
j=1
(h^ji   1j=i) 1
pjyj
 d ~Gj| {z }
network e¤ ect
 
nX
j=1
h^ji  1
pjyj
 j
1 + 

nX
k=1
d ~Gk| {z }
resource constraint e¤ ect
; (7)
where ~Gj = pjGj is nominal government spending on sector js output, h^ij is the ij-th element
of the Leontief inverse matrix H^ = (I   A^) 1, and A^ is the matrix with entries given by
a^ij =
pjxij
pjyj
(i.e., sales from industry j to industry i normalized by sales of industry j). This
implies that demand-side shocks do not propagate downstream (i.e., to customers of a¤ected
industries), only upstream (i.e., only to suppliers of a¤ected industries).
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This proposition is proved in Appendix A. Equations (6) and (7) form the basis of our
empirical strategy, and link the output of sector i to its own shock, dzi, and to shocks
hitting all other industries working through the input-output linkages of the economy. In
particular, in equation (6), dzi is the own shock, while
Pn
j=1(hij   1j=i)dzj is the network
e¤ect. Notice that this expression includes the propagation of the own shock through the
input-output linkages, hii   1, together with the network e¤ect, and then subtracts the own
e¤ect (via the indicator function 1j=i, which takes the value 1 when j = i and the value 0
otherwise), so as not to double count this direct e¤ect.8 Similarly, in equation (7), d
~Gi
piyi
is the
own shock and
Pn
j=1(h^ji   1j=i) 1pjyj d ~Gj is the network e¤ect.9 These equations have several
important implications.
First, what matters for the network e¤ects is not directly the entries of the input-output
matrix, A or A^, but its Leontief inverse. The intuition is instructive about the workings of the
model. For example, a negative productivity shock to industry j will reduce its production and
increase its price. This will adversely impact all of the industries that purchase inputs from
industry j. But this direct impact will be further augmented in the competitive equilibrium
because these rst-round-a¤ected industries will change their production and prices, creating
indirect negative e¤ects on other customer industries (downstream e¤ects). The Leontief
inverse captures these indirect e¤ects
Second, the network e¤ects in response to the demand-side and supply-side shocks are
rather di¤erent. For supply-side shocks, the network e¤ect,
Pn
j=1(hij   1j=i)dzj , implies that
the impact goes downstream (and not at all upstream). For demand-side shocks, the net-
work e¤ect is given by the term
Pn
j=1(h^ji   1j=i) 1pjyj d ~Gj , indicating upstream propagation
 the h^ji term signies the spread of a shock to industries that are suppliers of the af-
fected industries. Equation (7), in addition, includes the resource constraint e¤ect, the termPn
j=1 h^ji
1
pjyj
j
1+
Pn
k=1 d
~Gk, which reects the impact of government spending on the represen-
tative households budget constraint  the governments spending, nanced by taxes, leaves
fewer resources for private consumption. The parameter j here captures the fact that the
impact of the lower net income of the representative household on the consumption of sector j
depends on the share of this sector in consumption, given by j . When 
0 = 0 so that there is
no labor supply response and thus  = 0, this impact is maximized. On the other hand, when
there is a positive labor supply response, this e¤ect is partially o¤set by increased production
across the economy. It is also worth noting that these e¤ects are still propagated through the
input-output matrix as shown by the h^ji terms, because a decline in the consumption of good
j causes sector j to cut production and its input purchases from other sectors, leading to the
upstream transmission of the direct implications of the resource constraint.
The next two examples illustrate in greater detail why supply-side or productivity shocks
8The diagonals of the Leontief inverse matrix, H, are no less than 1, so that hii   1 is nonnegative.
9 In this case, the functional form assumption (l) = (1  l) is imposed to simplify the expressions.
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propagate downstream, while demand shocks propagate upstream.
Example 1 (Downstream propagation of supply-side shocks) Consider an economy
with three sectors, with the input-output network as shown in Panel A of Figure 2. Sector 1 is
the sole customer of sector 2, sector 2 is the sole customer of sector 3 and sector 3 is the sole
customer of sector 1. The sectoral production functions are therefore given as
y1 = e
z1 l
l1
1 x
a12
12 ; y2 = e
z2 l
l2
2 x
a23
23 ; and y3 = e
z3 l
l3
3 x
a31
31 ;
and are all assumed to satisfy constant returns to scale. It follows from Proposition 1 that
sector 1s output is:10
d ln y1 =
dz1 + a12dz2 + a12a23dz3
1  a12a23a31 :
This expression shows that sector 1s output depends on the shocks to all three sectors. However,
this is purely because of the propagation of productivity (supply-side) shocks downstream. For
example, sector 3s productivity shock, z3, a¤ects y1 not because of upstream propagation, but
because of the chain of downstream propagation: sector 1 is a customer of sector 2, and sector 2
is a customer of sector 3. Indeed, the coe¢ cient of z3 in this expression, a12a23, illustrates this
indirect e¤ect. To see further that there is no upstream propagation, consider a modication
of this input-output network as shown in Panel B of Figure 2, where the link between sector 2
and sector 3 is severed (i.e., a23 = 0). The output of sector 1 then becomes
d ln y1 = dz1 + a12dz2;
with no impact from z3. This veries that it was the indirect downstream transmission of sector
3s productivity shock that impacted sector 1. With the link between sectors 2 and 3 severed,
this indirect transmission ceases, and there is no longer any impact of z3 on sector 1. Had it
been the upstream propagation of productivity shocks, we would have seen a similar dependence
of sector 1s output on z3 since the input linkage between these two sectors has not changed.
The intuition for why there are no economic e¤ects working upstream through the input-
output network  as shown in Proposition 1 and Example 1  is related to the Cobb-Douglas
nature of the production functions and preferences. Any impact on upstream industries will
depend on the balance of a quantity e¤ect (less is produced in industry j after an adverse
productivity shock) and price e¤ect (each unit produced in industry j is now more expensive).
With Cobb-Douglas technologies and preferences from households, these two e¤ects exactly
cancel out.11 Downstream propagation, on the other hand, is a consequence of the fact that an
10Detailed derivations for this and the next example are provided in Appendix C, available online.
11Clearly Cobb-Douglas is an approximation, though arguably not a bad one since the U.S. input-output
matrix appears to be fairly stable over time, as shown, for example, in Acemoglu et al. (2012) (and with non-
Cobb-Douglas technologies this would not be the case). Our empirical results also give additional credence to
the notion that Cobb-Douglas is a useful approximation for our purposes. In any case, it should be emphasized
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adverse productivity shock to a sector leads to an increase in the price of that sectors output,
encouraging its customer industries to use this input less intensively and thus reduce their own
production. This downstream propagation is also the reason why the impact of a shock depends
only on input-output linkages, and not on the consumption shares, the js. The consumption
shares inuence the level of production in di¤erent sectors, but not the proportional responses
to productivity shocks; productivity shocks translate into proportional declines in prices and
thus proportional downstream transmission, regardless of consumption shares.
The next example illustrates the propagation of demand-side shocks.
Example 2 (Upstream propagation of demand-side shocks) Consider again the econ-
omy depicted in Panel A of Figure 2, but now with government spending shocks, expressed
in nominal terms as d ~G1; d ~G2; and d ~G3, rather than productivity shocks (and thus setting
dz1 = dz2 = dz3 = 0). We also set 1 = 2 = 3 = 1=3. In this case, the change in the
nominal output of sector 1 (with tildes again denoting nominal variables) can be derived as
d~y1 =
1
1  a12a23a31
8><>:
d ~G1 + a23a31d ~G2 + a31d ~G3
  (1+a31+a23a31)3(1+)
h
d ~G1 + d ~G2 + d ~G3
i
9>=>;
Once again, shocks to all three sectors inuence the nominal output of sector 1, but this time
it is because of the cumulative indirect e¤ects working upstream. In particular, the e¤ect of
the shock to sector 2, d ~G2, on sector 1 is working upstream through its impact on sector 3 and
then sector 3s impact on sector 1, as can be seen from the fact that this term is multiplied
by a23a31 in the rst line. The resource constraint e¤ect is shown in the second line. Similar
to our analysis in the previous example, we can verify that the network e¤ects shown in the
rst line are not working through downstream propagation by considering Panel B of Figure 2.
When the link between sectors 2 and 3 is severed (or equivalently when a23 = 0), the change
in the nominal output of sector 1 becomes
d~y1 = d ~G1 + a31d ~G3   (1 + a31)
3 (1 + )
h
d ~G1 + d ~G2 + d ~G3
i
;
where the second term is again the indirect e¤ect working through the household budget con-
straint. The absence of an impact from the government spending shock to sector 2 now conrms
that all propagation of demand-side shocks is upstream.
The intuition for why demand-side shocks propagate only upstream, as demonstrated in
Proposition 1 and Example 2, is also instructive. With government spending shocks, a¤ected
that the qualitative nature of the results emphasized in the proposition  that supply shocks will have larger
downstream e¤ects than upstream e¤ects  holds true with non-Cobb-Douglas technologies and preferences,
since even in this case quantity and price e¤ects would at least partially o¤set each other (and in fact, Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015b, show that similar results to those in Proposition 1 can be obtained as rst-
order approximations under general production technologies).
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industries have to increase their production to meet the increased demand from the government.
But given that they are using inputs from other supplier industries, this is only possible if
industries supplying inputs to them also expand their inputs (proportionately to the role of
these inputs in the production function of the a¤ected industries). This is the logic for upstream
propagation of demand-side shocks. Why is there no downstream propagation? Since all sectors
have constant returns to scale, prices in this economy are entirely independent of the demand
side. Government spending shocks change quantities but not prices (see Appendix A). But
this implies that the channel through which downstream propagation took place in response
to productivity shocks  changing relative prices  is entirely absent, accounting for the lack
of downstream propagation in response to demand-side shocks.
A third implication of equations (6) and (7) concerns the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients of
the own and network e¤ects. The simplest way of seeing this is to reorganize these equations
so that equation (6) becomes
d ln yi = hii  dzi +
X
j 6=i
hij  dzj ;
which implies that if the indirect impacts of the own shock are included with the direct e¤ect
(and excluded from the network e¤ect), then the coe¢ cients of the own and the network e¤ects,
when properly scaled by the entries of the Leontief inverse, should be equal.12 The same is
true for the demand-side shocks in equation (7), which can be rearranged as
d ln yi = h^ii
d ~Gi
piyi
+
X
j 6=i
h^ji
d ~Gj
pjyj
 
nX
j=1
h^ji
j
1 + 
nX
k=1
d ~Gk;
again showing the equality of the coe¢ cients of the properly scaled own and network e¤ects
(the rst two terms). These results readily extend to the employment equation by observing
that the employment e¤ects are derived from the output e¤ects, and are thus proportional to
them.
Fourth, equations (6) and (7) also imply that what matters in our theoretical framework are
the contemporaneous shocks (e.g., dzi), not some future anticipated shocks.13 This motivates
our use of current (or one-period lagged) shocks on the right-hand side of our estimating
equations.
Finally, we further note that the implications of import shocks are also very similar to
government spending shocks, since a decline in imports (without imposing trade balance) is
12 In fact, this equation implies that the coe¢ cients of the own and network e¤ects should both be equal to
one, though this prediction depends on the choice of units of the shocks, the dzs. In practice, the coe¢ cients
will be di¤erent than one but still equal to each other depending on the specic choices of units for measuring
our shocks.
13This can be seen straightforwardly by considering a dynamic version of the model (without additional
intertemporal linkages), in which case equations (6) and (7) would apply with time subscripts, with only dzit
being relevant for time t outcomes. In the presence of irreversible investments and/or other intertemporal
linkages at the sectoral level, expectations of future shocks would also matter.
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analogous to an increase in government spending on the same sectors, and for this reason, we
have not separately introduced these shocks in our theoretical model.
2.2 The E¤ects of the Geographic Network
Another important set of interlinkages, which could be represented as network e¤ects, relates
to geographic overlay over industries (corresponding to how industries collocate in various
local labor markets, for example as measured by commuting zones). Thinking through these
geographic interactions is important to ensure that our empirical work can distinguish input-
output network e¤ects from these geographic interlinkages; moreover, these local linkages are
also of direct interest as another transmitter of industry-level shocks.
Let us start with a simple reduced-form model capturing local demand e¤ects
d ln yr;i = 
X
j 6=i
yr;j
yr
d ln yr;j + dzi; (8)
where yr;i is the output of industry i in region r, and dzi is an industry shock normalized to
have a unit impact on the industrys output (in a region). In what follows, take  to be small
(and in particular less than 1).
This equation captures the idea that if industries in a given region (local labor market)
are hit by negative shocks, this will reduce economic activity and adversely a¤ect output and
employment in other industries, which is consistent with empirical evidence reported in Autor,
Dorn and Hanson (2013) and Mian and Su(2015). For example, if a large employer in a given
local labor market shuts down, this will reduce the demand and thus employment and output
of other local employers. The most obvious channel for this is through some local demand
e¤ects, though other local linkages would also lead to a relationship similar to (8).
The functional form in this equation is intuitive and implies that the impact of a propor-
tional decline in industry j on industry i in the same region will be scaled by the importance
of industry j in the regions output (yr;j=yr). Note also that, for simplicitys sake, we ignore
the network e¤ects coming from input-output linkages in this subsection.
The next step is to solve the within-region equilibrium implied by (8). Doing this with
matrix algebra, we can write
d ln yr;i = (I B) 1 dzi; (9)
where
B =
0BBBB@
0 
yr;2
yr

yr;3
yr
:::
0
0
0
0
1CCCCA
Given our analysis of input-output models, it is not surprising that a Leontief inverse type
matrix is playing a central role here. But in this instance, it is useful for us to go beyond
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this matrix representation. In particular, when  is small as we have assumed, second- and
higher-order terms in  can be ignored, and the within-region equilibrium can be expressed in
the following form:14
d ln yr;i  dzi + 
X
j 6=i
yr;j
yr
dzj :
Intuitively, this equation describes the within-region equilibrium as a function of shocks to all
industries (solving out all endogenousterms from the right-hand side). Now using the fact
that d ln yr;i = dyr;i=yr;i, and summing across regions, we obtain
dyi =
X
r
dyr;i  yidzi + 
X
r
X
j 6=i
yr;iyr;j
yr
dzj ;
which then enables us to obtain a simple representation of the geographic e¤ects:
d ln yi  dzi + 
X
j 6=i
geographic_overlayi;jdzj ; (10)
where
geographic_overlayi;j 
X
r
yr;iyr;j
yiyr
is the non-centered cross-region correlation coe¢ cient of industries i and j, normalized by their
national levels of production, and represents their tendency to collocate.
Intuitively, this equation captures the fact that industries will be impacted not only by
their direct shocks but also by the shocks of other industries that tend to collocate with them.
For example, if coal and steel industries are always in the same few regions, the steel industry
will be negatively a¤ected nationally not only when there is a negative shock to itself but
also when there is a negative shock to the coal industry, because when the coal industry is
producing less in the region, other industries in that region are also adversely a¤ected, and
steel is overrepresented among these industries that happen to be in the same region as coal.
Though the term we have for geographic overlay is simple and intuitive, it is based on
an approximation that involves ignoring all terms that are second or higher order in , thus
posing the natural question of whether including some of these additional terms would lead
to additional insights. To provide a partial answer to this question, we now include second-
order terms (thus ignoring only third- or higher-order terms in ), which leads to a natural
generalization of (10). In particular, the within-region equilibrium can now be expressed as
d ln yr;i  dii + 
X
j 6=i
yr;j
yr
dzj + 
2
X
j 6=i
yr;j
yr
X
k 6=j
yr;k
yr
dzk:
14More formally, when  is small, the inverse (I B) 1 necessarily exists, and thus has an innite series
expansion of the form:
(I B) 1 = I+B+B2 +B3 + :::
Moreover, when  is small, we can also approximate this inverse with the rst two terms, which leads to the
next equation. We describe below calculations and empirical tests with higher-order terms.
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Now summing across regions and repeating the same steps as above, we obtain
d ln yi = dzi + 
X
j 6=i
geographic_overlayi;jdzj + 
2
X
j 6=i
X
k 6=j;i
geographic_overlayi;j;kdzj
where the additional geographic overlay term, which includes triple collocation patterns, is
geographic_overlayi;j;k 
X
r
yr;iyr;jyr;k
yiy2r
: (11)
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes our various data sources and the construction of the key measures of
downstream and upstream e¤ects and the geographic network.
3.1 Data Sources
Our core industry-level data for manufacturing come from the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database (Becker, Grey and Marvakov, 2013). We utilize data for the years 1991-
2009. Using the rst change as a baseline, our estimations cover 17 changes from 1992-1993
to 2008-2009. In the rst four changes, we have 392 four-digit industries; thereafter, we have
384 industries for 6560 total observations. Though the theoretical predictions derived in the
previous section are in terms of total industry output (shipments), our baseline analysis focuses
on (real) value added due to its adjustment for energy costs, non-manufacturing inputs, and
inventory changes which are all outside of our model. We show similar results using real and
nominal shipments in Appendix B, available online.
To construct our linkages between industries, we use the Bureau of Economic Analysis1992
Input-Output Matrix and the 1991 County Business Patterns database as described further
below. In the next section, we describe the data used for each shock when introducing it.
3.2 Upstream and Downstream Networks
The construction of downstream and upstream e¤ects follows Acemoglu et al. (2015). We
construct the matrix A introduced in Section 2 from the 1992 Make and UseTables of
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This matrix has input share entries corresponding to
aij  Salesj!i
Salesi
:
As emphasized in Section 2, this quantity measures the total sales of inputs from industry
j to industry i, normalized by the total sales (or equivalently the total costs) of industry i.
Intuitively, it corresponds to how many dollars worth of the output of sector j (say tires) sector
i (say the car industry) needs to purchase to produce one dollar worth of its own output. When
production functions are Cobb-Douglas, as we have assumed in our theoretical analysis, these
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input shares are constant regardless of prices. Equation (6) shows that network e¤ects from
supply-side shocks directly depend on these input shares. The Leontief inverse of the input-
output matrix is then computed from the matrix of these input-output shares as (I A) 1
to give our downstream network measure. In what follows, we use the notation Input%j!i to
represent the elements of the Leontief inverse of the input-output matrix.15
For constructing the network e¤ects from demand-side shocks, we again follow equation
(7), which decomposes the response of a sector into an own e¤ect, a network e¤ect and the
resource constraint e¤ect. We rst ignore the last one and focus on the network e¤ect. The
presence of the h^ji (or a^ji) terms in this equation underscores the di¤erent aspects of input-
output linkages involved in upstream propagation. The empirical counterparts of the a^ij terms
are
Salesi!j
Salesi
 ajiSalesj
Salesi
;
which we use to compute the upstream network measures. We use Output%i!j to represent
these Leontief inverse terms. We return to the resource constraint e¤ect later.
3.3 Geographic Overlay
We also measure the geographic overlay of two industries using the metric developed in the
theory section,
geographic_overlayi;j 
X
r
yr;iyr;j
yiyr
:
We dene regions through BEA commuting zones and utilize 1991 County Business Patterns
data to measure the overlay. We also calculate the higher-order geographic overlay term (11).
In practice, however, we observe very little additional explanatory power with the second
metric and thus focus simply on the direct collocation case.
3.4 Correlation Matrices
Table 1a shows the correlation matrix of these interconnections, excluding own-industry inter-
connections (i.e., network diagonals). Upstream and downstream material ows are moderately
correlated at 0.4 and somewhat less strongly correlated with geographic overlay, indicating that
input-output linkages operate, for the most part, beyond common geographies.
Table 1b depicts the correlation of our four measures of shocks with each other, and shows
that our di¤erent shocks are only weakly correlated, assuaging concerns that we may be tracing
the e¤ects of omitted shocks when modeling the e¤ect of each shock one at the time. Col-
umn 5 of Table 1b reports the average between-industry correlation for each shock (e.g., how
correlated is, say, the federal spending shock of an industry with the federal spending shocks
of other industries). This is relevant in part because a high between-industry correlation of
15We use this notation rather than hij as in Section 2 to emphasize that these are the empirical counterparts
of the theoretical notions developed above.
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shocks might create spurious network e¤ects in the presence of an omitted higher-order im-
pact of own shocks. The relatively low between-industry correlations, except for the federal
spending shock, are comforting in this regard. The higher between-industry correlation for the
federal spending shock is unsurprising since it is constructed from the interaction of aggregate
time-series variation in federal spending with a time-invariant measure of federal spending
dependency of each industry (as detailed further below).
4 Results: The Input-Output Network
This section provides our primary empirical results that quantify shock propagation through
the input-output networks, leaving the analysis of the geographic network to the next section.
We focus on four shocks: (1) import penetration; (2) federal spending changes; (3) TFP growth;
and (4) foreign patenting growth. The rst two correspond to demand-side shocks, while the
latter two are supply-side, approximating productivity shocks. We rst consider each shock by
itself, describing how we measure it, and studying its empirical properties in isolation. After
cycling through all four shocks independently, we jointly model them and provide an extended
discussion of economic magnitudes.
4.1 Empirical Approach
Throughout, our main estimating equations are direct analogs of equations (6) and (7) in the
theory section, and take the following form:
 lnYi;t = t +   lnYi;t 1 + ownShocki;t 1 (12)
+upstreamUpstreami;t 1 + downstreamDownstreami;t 1 + "i;t;
where i indexes industries, t denotes a full set of time e¤ects, "i;t is an error term, and Yi;t
stands for one of three industry-level variables from the NBER manufacturing database: real
value added (using the industrys shipments deator), employment, and real labor productivity
(real value added divided by employment).
In our baseline results, time periods correspond to years. We start with a model that only
considers the core regressors outlined in equation (12), and then we show robustness checks
that add extra controls. We allow only a single lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand
side for parsimony. The role of additional lags is taken up in robustness checks.
The key regressors are Shocki;t 1, the industrys own direct shock (taken from one of
the four shocks introduced above), and Upstreami;t 1 and Downstreami;t 1 which stand for
the shocks working through the network. These network shocks are always computed from
the interaction of the vector of shocks hitting other industries and a vector representing the
interlinkages between the focal industry and the rest (e.g., the row or the column of the input-
output matrix); we provide exact details below.
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The upstream and downstream terminology in network analyses has some ambiguity. In
the remainder, we follow our usage in Section 2 and label upstream e¤ectsas those arising
from shocks to customers of an industry that ow up the input-output chain; in parallel, we
describe downstream e¤ectsas those arising from shocks to suppliers of an industry that ow
down the input-output chain. Henceforth, for clarity, we use upstreamand downstream
terms to describe exclusively the e¤ects. When there is a need to describe where the shock
originates, we will use the terms customerand supplierto avoid confusion.
Thus, we measure downstream e¤ects (due to supplier shocks) and upstream e¤ects (due
to customer shocks) closely mimicking the theoretical equations, (6) and (7). In particular,
these are given by the weighted averages of shocks hitting all industries using entries of the
Leontief inverse matrices as weights:
Downstreami;t =
X
j
(Input%1991j!i   1j=i)  Shockj;t; (13)
and
Upstreami;t =
X
j
(Output%1991i!j   1j=i)  Shockj;t; (14)
where 1j=i is an indicator function for j = i, and the summation is over all industries, including
industry i itself. Thus as in the equations (6) and (7), when computing the downstream e¤ect
for sector i, we take into account the indirect linkages from this industry to itself (e.g., the fact
that industry i supplies to industry j, which is also a supplier to i), but we subtract the direct
e¤ect of the shock, since in our regressions we will directly control for the shock to sector i.
Several other points are worth noting. First, as already observed, input-output linkages
(and thus the Leontief inverse entries) are pre-determined and measured in 1991. Thus, down-
stream and upstream e¤ects are simply a function of shocks in connected industries working
through a pre-determined input-output network.
Second, we lag both own and network shocks by one period, simply to avoid any concern
about contemporaneous measurement issues from our dependent variables to shocks (e.g.,
in the case of TFP) and about contemporaneous joint determination. It should be stressed,
however, that we do not claim that this timing will enable us to estimate causal e¤ects. Rather,
we rely on the plausible exogeneity of shocks, especially for imports from China and federal
government spending, and caution that this exogeneity is likely to be absent in the case of the
TFP and foreign patenting shocks.
Third, equation (12) is formulated in changes, and shocks are always specied in changes
as detailed below. The specication could have alternatively been written in levels together
with an industry xed e¤ect. The advantage of the current formulation is that it both follows
more directly from and connects to our theoretical model, and imposes that the error term is
stationary in di¤erences, which is generally a better description of macro time series.
Finally, in what follows, unless otherwise stated, we standardize the Shocki;t 1 variable so
that a unit increase corresponds to a one standard-deviation change in the positive direction
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(e.g., decrease in imports or increase in TFP), and the Upstreami;t 1 and Downstreami;t 1
variables are constructed in the same units. This implies that the coe¢ cient on the Shocki;t 1
variable will measure the impact of a one standard-deviation increase in the industrys own
shock, whereas the coe¢ cients on Upstreami;t 1 andDownstreami;t 1 will measure the impact
of a one standard-deviation increase in the shock of all customers and suppliers of an industry.
Moreover, all of these coe¢ cients are directly comparable and are expected to be positive where
theory predicts a network-based e¤ect.
4.2 China Import Shocks
Our rst shock relates to the growth of imports from China and follows Autor et al. (2013)
and Acemoglu et al. (2015). Acemoglu et al. (2015) show this pattern for decade-long
adjustments, and we extend this analysis to shorter frequencies considered in macroeconomics.
As highlighted in Section 2, this demand-side shock should have greater upstream e¤ects than
downstream e¤ects, and in the case of Cobb-Douglas, downstream e¤ects should not be present
at all.
We rst dene ChinaTrade to capture this industry exposure to rising Chinese trade,
ChinaTradej;t =  
U.S. Imports from Chinaj;t
U.S. market sizej;1991
:
This variable, however, is clearly endogenous, as it will tend to be higher when the industry
in question has lower productivity growth for other reasons, creating greater room for a rise
in imports, and is thus not a good measure of shocks for our analysis. To deal with this
endogeneity concern, we follow Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) and instrument
this variable with its exogenous component, dened as the change in import penetration from
China to eight major non-U.S. countries relative to 1991 U.S. market volume, with the nations
being Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland:
ChinaTradeIVj;t =  
Non-U.S. Imports from Chinaj;t
U.S. market sizej;1991
:
This instrument has the advantage of not being directly a¤ected by changes in productivity or
demand in the U.S. economy.16
The downstream and upstream e¤ects are calculated from (13) and (14) adapted to this
case. For example, for the downstream e¤ects coming from supplier industries, we model the
shock:
DownstreamTradei;t =
X
j
(Input%1991j!i   1j=i) ChinaTradej;t: (15)
16First-stage equations naturally also control for all other covariates from the second stage, including the
lagged dependent variable, to ensure consistent estimation. But of course, the only excluded instrument is the
exogenous component of the change in import penetration.
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We also construct the network instruments using the same reasoning as in (13) and (14). For
example, for the downstream e¤ects this simply takes the form of
DownstreamTradeIVi;t =
X
j
(Input%1991j!i   1j=i) ChinaTradeIVj;t :
In summary, we have three endogenous variables, ChinaTradej;t, DownstreamTradei;t
and UpstreamTradei;t , and three instruments, ChinaTrade
IV
j;t , Downstream
TradeIV
i;t and
UpstreamTradeIVi;t . The rst stages for these three variables are shown in Appendix Table
1 (all appendix tables are included in Appendix B).
Table 2a presents our estimates of own and network e¤ects from this exercise, using a table
format which we replicate for each subsequent shock. Table 2a presents our baseline results
for the three outcome variables, considering one and three lags for the dependent variable, and
shows strong upstream e¤ects on supplier industries (similar to Acemoglu et al. 2015).
More specically, recall that we have standardized (in terms of standard-deviation units)
and normalized all of our shocks to be positive, so that an increase in imports from China
corresponds to a negative value of the shocks, and thus positive coe¢ cients imply that rising
imports from China reduce value added and employment in the a¤ected industries. In this light,
the results in Column 1 indicate that a one standard-deviation own-industry shock reduces the
focal industrys value added growth by 3.4%.17 More interestingly given our focus, they also
indicate that a similar one standard-deviation change in customers of an industry leads to
a 7.6% decline in value added growth through upstream e¤ects. Downstream e¤ects are of
opposite sign and statistically insignicant, though they are sometimes quantitatively sizable.
Lack of (same-signed) signicant downstream e¤ects in response to demand-side shocks is
consistent with our main theoretical implications outlined in Section 2. Finally, the bottom
row of the table tests the other implication from the theory highlighted in Proposition 1,
that the relevant diagonal entry from the Leontief inverse matrix (i.e., the coe¢ cient on hii 
ChinaTradei;t 1) should be equal to the upstream e¤ect from other industries. For value
added, this restriction is marginally rejected at 10%, though it is not rejected in any of the
other columns.18
Column 2 shows that the overall pattern is similar when two more lags of the dependent
variable are included on the right-hand side, even though these lags show some evidence of
additional persistence. In particular, the quantitative implications are very similar, and it is
again the upstream e¤ects that are signicant while the downstream ones are not.
Our regression specications follow directly from Proposition 1 (for example, in the case of
17The unweighted standard deviation in industry growth rates for our sample is 0.15 for log value added
growth and 0.10 for log employment growth.
18This restriction is not tested directly from the reported regression, but from the related regression described
in Section 2, following Proposition 1, where own e¤ects reect the diagonal elements of the Leontief inverse
matrix. We report specications in which the own e¤ects are not scaled in this manner to maintain transparency
about the direct rst-order e¤ects of own-industry shocks. In any case, the coe¢ cient estimates when we
undertake this scaling are similar to those reported in the tables in the paper.
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the China import shocks, equation (7)). The coe¢ cient estimates in these regression equations
do not directly translate into quantitative e¤ects for multipliers,however. This is because
the upstream e¤ect (the relevant dimension of the network e¤ects in this case) corresponds to
the impact of the shock of all other industries, weighted by their upstream linkages, on the
focal industry. Instead, to obtain an economically meaningful multiplier, measuring how large
the total impact of a shock is relative to its direct e¤ect, we need to measure its impact on all
other industries. To achieve this, we convert upstream and downstream e¤ects into a weighted
average of shocks in other industries using the Leontief inverse elements of weights.19 We use
these adjusted estimates to construct the impulse response functions depicted in Figure 1a
and for computing the relevant multipliers. Panel A of Figure 1a depicts the impulse response
of value added to a one standard-deviation Chinese import shock obtained from this exercise
(with a specication corresponding to Column 2 of Table 2a). These impulse responses show
that the quantitative magnitude of the network e¤ects (in this case, upstream e¤ects, since we
are focusing on demand-side shocks) are considerably larger than the direct e¤ect: the direct
e¤ect (from the own shock) after ten periods is a 3.46% increase in value added growth, while
the total impact is a 22.09% (3:46 + 18:64) increase in value added. This yields a multiplier of
6.4 (' 22:09=3:46), and implies that input-output linkages more than double the direct e¤ects
of demand-side shocks. It can be seen from the gure that the implied multipliers are very
similar at di¤erent horizons.
Columns 3 and 4 turn to employment. The overall pattern and even the quantitative
magnitudes are very similar, with clear upstream e¤ects and no downstream e¤ects, and the
theory-implied restrictions receive support from our estimates. Panel A of Figure 1b depicts
the impulse response of employment to the same shock as in Figure 1a. The implied multiplier
in this case (for employment changes) is 5.86.
Columns 5 and 6 turn to labor productivity. Here we nd no robust patterns, which is
not surprising since Columns 1-4 document that the numerator and denominator move in the
same direction and by similar amounts.
Table 2b reports multiple robustness checks. Our results are very similar without the own-
19More specically, focusing on upstream e¤ects, recall that Upstreami;t =
X
j
(Output%1991i!j   1j=i) 
Shockj;t, whereas for this term to capture the quantitative impact of shocks on supplier industries, we would
need it to take the form X
j
(Output%1991i!j   1j=i)X
k
(Output%1991i!k   1k=i)
 Shockj;t;
so that it corresponds to a weighted average of shocks hitting industries.
The simplest and most transparent approach to make this adjustment is to divide our coe¢ cient estimates by
the average of the
X
k
(Output%1991i!k  1k=i)s, i.e., by 1n
X
i
X
k
(Output%1991i!k  1k=i) (where n is the number
of industries). The adjustment for the downstream e¤ect is very similar. From the U.S. input-output matrix,
this adjustment factor is 2:156.
An alternative method would be to rerun all of our specications using the adjusted upstream and down-
stream measures (computed as weighted averages as indicated above). This method yields estimates of network
multipliers for value added and employment of 5.9 and 8.0, respectively, which are comparable to the 6.4 and
5.9 multipliers estimated by the direct adjustment method outlined here and reported below.
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shock term. Our baseline estimates are unweighted, and we obtain similar results when we
weight observations by log 1991 value added or by 1991 employment levels. We also consider a
series of more demanding specications where we include a full set of two-, three- and four-digit
SIC dummies. Since our specication in equation (12) is in changes, this amounts to including
linear time trends for these industry groupings. The results are generally robust, although
the downstream e¤ects do move around and sometimes become larger, even if still far from
signicance.
The nal column of Table 2b returns to the resource constraint e¤ect identied in Propo-
sition 1. As noted above, our baseline specications focusing on demand-side shocks have
ignored this resource constraint e¤ect, corresponding to the third term in equation (7). To the
extent that this term is correlated with our network e¤ect, it may lead to biased estimates.
We compute the empirical equivalent of this third term following equation (7) closely. We sum
nominal manufacturing imports from China to obtain the term
Pn
k=1 d
~Gk, multiply it with an
estimate of j , computed as the value added share of industry j, divide it by pjyj , and then
multiply it with the corresponding entries of the Leontief inverse of the upstream linkages to
obtain
Pn
j=1 h^ji
1
pjyj
j
Pn
k=1 d
~Gk (ignoring the term 1 +  in the denominator). We then add
this term as an additional regressor instrumented by an additional instrument computed in the
same way from Chinese imports by the same eight non-U.S. advanced economies. The nal
column of Table 2b shows that this specication leads to somewhat larger network e¤ects, but
the overall picture remains unchanged.
Appendix Table 2a repeats this analysis with log real shipments growth as the outcome
variable, and also shows similar results.
An additional issue is that the presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand
side of our estimating equation, (12), introduces the possibility of biased estimates when the
time dimension is short due to the challenges of obtaining consistent estimates of the persistence
parameter,  , with short panels as noted by Nickell (1981). We further investigate this issue
in Appendix Table 2b. In particular, our main concern here is with the network e¤ects, which
may inherit the bias of the parameter  in short panels. One way of ensuring that this bias
is not responsible for our results is to impose di¤erent values for the parameter  and verify
that this has no or little impact on our results (see Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson,
2014). Appendix Table 2b performs this exercise for the China trade shock and documents
that both own and upstream e¤ects are highly signicant and similar to our baseline estimates
for any value of  between our estimate of this parameter in Table 2a ( = 0) and the full
unit root limit ( = 1), becoming only a little weaker at the full unit root case of  = 1 (while
downstream e¤ects remain insignicant except marginally at  = 1).
Appendix Table 2c considers longer time periods, thus linking our results more closely to
Acemoglu et al. (2015), who focused on a decadal panel. For two-year periods, we prepare
nine time periods from 1991 1993 to 2007 2009: For three-year periods, we consider six time
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periods from 1991  1994 to 2006  2009: For four-year periods, we consider four time periods
from 1991 1995 to 2003 2007: For ve-year periods, we consider 1991 1996; 1996 2001; and
2001  2006. In each case, the rst period is used to create the network lags. The downstream
customer e¤ects and own-industry e¤ects tend to grow with longer time periods.
In addition to these robustness checks, Appendix Table 6 shows very similar outcomes when
we consider nominal value added and shipments growth instead of our baseline real value added
growth and the real shipments shown in Appendix Table 2a. Appendix Table 7 also reports
results where we vary the number of lags included for own-industry shocks and network shocks.
We report in the table the sums of the coe¢ cients across the deeper lags and their statistical
signicance. These variants yield quite similar conclusions to our reported estimations.
4.3 Federal Spending Shocks
The next analysis considers changes in U.S. federal government spending levels, which are an-
ticipated to operate similar to trade shocks by a¤ecting industries through heightened demand
from industrial customers. We rst calculate from the 1992 BEA Input-Output Matrix the
share of sales for each industry that went to the federal government,
FedSales%i =
Salesi!Fed
Salesi
:
This share ranges from zero dependency for about 10% of industries to over 50% for the top
percentile of industries in terms of dependency. Some prominent examples and their share
of sales include 3731 Ship Building and Repairing (76%), 3761 Guided Missiles and Space
Vehicles (74%), 3482 Small Arms Ammunition (65%), and 3812 Search, Detection, Navigation,
Guidance, Aeronautical and Nautical Systems and Instruments (51%).
We interact this measure with the log change in federal government expenditures,
FederalShocki;t = FedSales%
1991
i  lnFederalSpendingt 1;
holding xed the industry dependency at its 1991 level. Intuitively, the specication anticipates
greater shocksfrom aggregate federal budget changes for industries that have larger initial
shares of sales to the federal government. The change in federal spending is lagged one year
to reect the fact that procurement frequently extends into the following year. Once again
following (13) and (14), the downstream e¤ects in this case are dened as
DownstreamFederali;t =
X
j
(Input%1991j!i   1j=i)  FederalShockj;t:
A similar approach is taken for the other network metrics.
Because this variable focuses on federal spending changes in the aggregate (driven by,
among other things, swings in political moods, ideology, identity of the government, wars and
budget exigencies), and is then constructed with the interaction of these aggregate changes
with the time-invariant and pre-determined dependency of each industry on federal spending,
21
we believe that it can be taken as plausibly exogenous to the contemporaneous productivity
or supply-side shocks hitting the focal industry.
The structure of Table 3a is identical to those examining trade shocks. The results are also
similar. For example, in Table 3a, upstream e¤ects are again signicant and quantitatively
sizable (about three to ve times as large as own e¤ects). Downstream e¤ects are now of the
same sign as the upstream e¤ect, but continue to be statistically insignicant. The theory-
implied restriction reported in the bottom row is again broadly supported (it is never rejected
at 5%). In addition, the own e¤ect is insignicant when we only control for one lag of the
dependent variable, but signicant both in Columns 2 and 4 when we control for three lags.
Table 3b and Appendix Tables 3a-3c, 6 and 7 perform the same robustness checks as
those discussed for trade shocks and show that the above-mentioned patterns are generally
quite robust. All in all, the propagation of this very di¤erent demand-side shock appears
remarkably similar to the propagation of the import shocks, and in both cases in line with the
theory we have used to motivate our approach.
The economic magnitudes are once more far from trivial. Panel B of Figures 1a and 1b
depict the impulse response functions for own and upstream e¤ects computed in the same way
as for Panel A, and indicate that there are once again sizable network e¤ects. The implied
network multipliers for value added and employment at the 10-year horizon are 6.42 and 5.00,
respectively.
4.4 TFP Shocks
We next turn to supply-side shocks, starting with TFP. Baseline TFP shocks for manufactur-
ing industries are the lagged change in four-factor TFP taken from the NBER Productivity
Database. Importantly, these TFP measures control for materials, and thus should not be
mechanically a function of downstream e¤ects (changes in prices and quantities in industries
supplying inputs to the focal industry).
Similar to our other network-based measures, these are constructed by aggregating these
industry-level log components of TFP in connected industries. Continuing our illustration
using downstream e¤ects from shocks to supplier industries and again following on (13) and
(14), we model
DownstreamTFPi;t =
X
j
(Input%1991j!i   1j=i)  lnTFPj;t:
We should caution that the case for the exogeneity of the TFP shocks is weaker, because
past TFP may be endogenous to other shocks (e.g., to capacity utilization or labor hoarding)
which have a persistent impact on value added and factor demands. With this caveat, we still
believe that predetermined TFP shocks are informative about how supply-side shocks spread
through the input-output network.
The structure of Table 4a is identical to those examining trade and federal spending shocks.
Consistent with theory, it is now downstream e¤ects that are more sizable and important,
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though in this case there are some statistically signicant estimates of upstream e¤ects as well.
For example, in Column 1 of Table 4a, downstream e¤ects are estimated to have a coe¢ cient
of 0.060 (standard error = 0.020), while upstream e¤ects come in at 0.024 (standard error =
0.011). Interestingly, own e¤ects are small and imprecise for value added, but more precisely
estimated (though still about half of the upstream e¤ects) for employment. The theoretical
restriction tested in the bottom row is now rejected for value added, where the own e¤ects are
small, but is in closer alignment for employment. The robustness checks reported in Appendix
B conrm this overall pattern.20
Economic magnitudes can again be gleaned from Panel C of Figures 1a and 1b; the implied
multipliers are 15.56 and 4.43 for value added growth and employment growth over ten years,
respectively. The larger multiplier for value added in this case reects the smaller direct (own)
impact.
4.5 Foreign Patenting Shocks
Our nal shock represents changes in patented technology frontiers. Since this shock also
captures supply-side changes in productivity, responses to it should be similar to those to TFP
shocks.
Baseline patent shocks for manufacturing industries in Table 5a are the lagged log change in
USPTO granted patents led by overseas inventors associated with the industry. We measure
foreign patent shocks using USPTO granted patents through 2009. We develop a new con-
cordance of patent classes to four-digit manufacturing industries that extends the earlier work
of Silverman (1999), Johnson (1999), and Kerr (2008). Continuing our downstream e¤ects
example, we have
DownstreamForeignPatenti;t =
X
j
(Input%1991j!i   1j=i)  lnPatentsForeignj;t :
These foreign patents quantify technology changes in the world technology frontier external
to the U.S. economy (e.g., patents led by car manufacturers in Germany and Japan signal
advances in automobile technologies that have not originated in the United States). There
are two additional di¢ culties in this case, however. First, foreign patenting may be correlated
with past technological improvements in the U.S. sectors, which might have persistent e¤ects.
Second, improved technology abroad may directly impact U.S. rms through ercer product
market competition, not just through technology and productivity spillovers (e.g., Bloom,
Shankerman and Van Reenen, 2013).21 These concerns make us more cautious in interpreting
the foreign patenting shocks, especially for own e¤ects, though we believe that this analysis is
still informative about network-based propagation.
20However, in this case, Appendix Table 4b shows that the results are sensitive to the exact value of the
persistence parameter,  .
21Bloom et al. (2013) develop a strategy for controlling for this competition e¤ect, but the implementation
of their strategy is not feasible given our industry-level data.
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Table 5a shows strong downstream e¤ects with again no evidence of sizable upstream ef-
fects. The theory-implied restrictions in the bottom row of the table are typically rejected,
reecting the very small and sometimes incorrectly-signed estimates of own e¤ects. One possi-
ble explanation for this pattern of own e¤ects is that, as already noted, an increase in foreign
patents in ones own industry likely signals ercer competition from international competitors.
The network e¤ects, which should be less impacted by these considerations, are again quite
similar to our theorys predictions.
Panel D of Figures 1a and 1b again depict the impulse responses of value added and em-
ployment. We do not compute multipliers in this case, since the own e¤ects are imprecisely
estimated and potentially biased for the reasons explained above, thus making multiplier esti-
mates harder to interpret.
4.6 VAR Analysis
Our empirical specication, (12), directly builds on our theoretical model (in particular, equa-
tions (6) and (7)), and expresses the endogenous response of value added and employment to
shocks hitting all industries. An alternative is to follow vector auto regression (VAR) models
and express endogenous variables as a function of own shocks and the values of the endogenous
variables of linked industries. The analog of equation (12) in this case would be
 lnYi;t = t +   lnYi;t 1 + ownShocki;t 1 (16)
+upstream lnY Upstreami;t 1 + 
downstream lnY Downstreami;t 1 + "i;t;
which only features the shock hitting sector i, and models upstream and downstream ef-
fects from the changes in value added of linked industries  the terms  lnY Upstreami;t 1 and
 lnY Downstreami;t 1 . This equation could also be derived from our theoretical framework. Rela-
tive to our baseline empirical model, (12), this specication faces two related problems. First,
the terms  lnY Upstreami;t 1 and  lnY
Downstream
i;t 1 generate a version of Manskis well-known re-
ection problem (Manski, 1993), as outcome variables of one industry are being regressed on
the contemporaneous (or one-period lagged) outcomes of other industries, creating the possi-
bility of spurious correlation. Second, these terms are also more likely to be correlated with
each other, potentially leading to multicollinearity, which will make distinguishing these various
e¤ects more di¢ cult.
These problems notwithstanding, we now estimate equation (16) to show that the re-
sults from this complementary approach are broadly similar. To avoid the most severe form
of the reection problem, throughout we instrument for the upstream and downstream ef-
fects,  lnY Upstreami;t 1 and  lnY
Downstream
i;t 1 , using the rst and second lags of each shock as
experienced in the network (i.e., our instruments are the core regressors in equation (12),
Upstreami;t 1 and Downstreami;t 1). We report two specications per shock. In the rst,
we model and instrument the focal part of the network relevant for each shock (e.g., upstream
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e¤ects for supply-side shocks and downstream e¤ects for demand-side shocks). In the second
specication, we include and instrument for both upstream and downstream e¤ects. Also, in
the case of China trade shocks, we continue to instrument for the own shock, Shocki;t 1 as
well.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6 and are quite consistent with our baseline
ndings. Even though this empirical specication is more demanding for the reasons explained
above, the specications focusing on China trade and TFP shocks give similar results, and
specications using federal spending shocks also lead to similar results for value added, though
not for employment. Foreign patenting results do not hold with this approach, however.22
4.7 Combined Shock Analysis
Table 7 estimates own, upstream and downstream e¤ects simultaneously from several of the
shocks so far analyzed in isolation. This is relevant for two related reasons. First, we would like
to verify that our downstream and upstream e¤ects indeed capture network-based propagation
of di¤erent types of shocks rather than some other omitted characteristics, and attempting to
simultaneously estimate these e¤ects provides some information on this concern. Second, it
is important to quantify whether the simultaneous operation of all of these networked e¤ects
creates attenuation, which is relevant for our quantitative evaluation.
Table 7 shows the estimates of upstream and downstream e¤ects in this joint analysis are
remarkably similar to our previous results. Appendix Table 8 also shows this similarity when
we exclude the foreign patenting shocks due to the concerns about own e¤ects discussed above.
These results bolster our condence in the patterns documented so far and also suggest that
the quantitative magnitudes of the propagation through these input-output networks is larger
when we consider all four shocks simultaneously.
To quantify impacts from this joint exercise, we now consider one standard-deviation
changes of the three shocks, imports from China, federal spending and TFP, simultaneously.
The impulse response functions from this exercise are shown in Figure 2 in Appendix B, and
the combined multipliers for value added and employment growth in Panels A and B are 11.47
and 8.23, respectively. Thus, the network elements jointly continue to account for more uc-
tuation than direct components. The lower panels show similar results when including foreign
patenting shocks.
22Appendix Figure 1 reports impulse response functions akin to Figures 1a and 1b using the results from
Table 6, where we trace out a one-standard deviation upstream or downstream network component in terms of
value added or employment, as instrumented by each shock, alongside the direct e¤ect of the shock. For brevity,
we only plot the stable and theory-consistent estimates, which are the ones that are meaningful to compare
to our baseline results. The resulting magnitudes are comparable to, though somewhat larger than, our main
estimates.
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4.8 Monte Carlo Verication
Though our empirical strategy so far has closely followed our theoretical model, there are
several aspects in which the true data generating process might be more complicated than the
one implied by our model. First, our model abstracted from dynamic interactions between
sectors, whereas the original Long and Plosser (1983) paper assumed that an industry could
only use as inputs at time t the output produced by other industries at time t 1. This dynamic
structure implies that rather than shocks being transmitted through the Leontief inverse of
the input-output matrix as in our equations (6) and (7), they would be transmitted from one
period to the next directly through the input-output matrix. Over time, this transmission
would still lead to a cumulative impact as summarized by the Leontief inverse (as we show in
Appendix C). Nevertheless, we might be concerned that this type of slow adjustment would
lead to signicant misspecication in our empirical work, where we impose equations (6) and
(7). In Appendix C, we conduct a Monte Carlo exercise where data are generated at quarterly
frequency using the Long and Plosser (1983) timing (and shocks are serially correlated), and
regressions are run at the annual frequency using the specications we have utilized so far
(thus ltering the observed shocks through the Leontief inverse of the input-output matrix).
We nd that the time averaging of the higher frequency data to annual observations ensures
that specications based on the Leontief inverse do not lead to any major misspecication. In
particular, our results, described in detail in Appendix Figures 4-7, indicate that regressions
run time-averaged data can recover whether upstream or downstream linkages are important.
A second concern is whether measurement error in the input-output matrix might be sig-
nicantly amplied when we compute the Leontief inverses. Another Monte Carlo exercise we
perform in Appendix C veries that even if the input-output matrix is measured with error,
regressions of the sort we have used are capable of recovering the correct parameters. We take
these two Monte Carlo exercises as useful conrmation of the robustness and informativeness
of our empirical strategy.
5 Additional Results: The Geographic Network
We next turn to an analysis of the geographic networks impact on the propagation of shocks.
The theory in Section 2 describes how shocks to an industry can also propagate regionally
(e.g., within commuting zones) because they expand or depress economic activity, impacting
the decisions of other industries in the area. Though a full analysis of these local interactions
is beyond the scope of the present e¤ort (see, for example, the treatment of Acemoglu et al.
(2015) for medium-frequency import shocks on local economies), we can nonetheless get a sense
of the importance of these channels of propagation by looking at the impact of a shock to a
particular industry on other industries that tend to collocate with it. This is essentially the
idea of the geographic network introduced above.
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Table 8 considers all four geographic e¤ects simultaneously, which is particularly relevant
since they are all working through the same local geographic networks. In Columns 1 and 3
we only model own-industry e¤ects and geographic spillovers, while Columns 2 and 4 add the
downstream and upstream network e¤ects as well. Our most important observation from this
analysis is the stability of the network e¤ects compared to Table 7. The latter continues to
adhere to theory and shows that our network e¤ects are not proxying for regional spillovers
or similar local conditions. The second observation is that the geographic e¤ects are almost
always precisely estimated and are quite substantial in size for demand-side shocks.
Appendix Table 9a shows that these joint patterns are robust to the specication checks
considered earlier for input-output linkages. Appendix Table 9b considers each of the four
shocks in isolation rather than jointly modeling them. Similar to the results presented in
Table 8, the inclusion of geographic e¤ects has little impact on our estimates of downstream
and upstream network e¤ects, which continue to adhere to theory. On the other hand, the
geographic e¤ects themselves are less stable and often substantially smaller when measured in
isolation compared to the joint format. We thus remain cautious about strong interpretations
of the size of the geographic e¤ects compared to the overall stability that these specications
show for our network components.
With these caveats, the economic magnitudes of Table 8s e¤ects are substantial. Figure
3 in Appendix B shows the impulse response functions including own and network e¤ects in
response to a one standard-deviation shock in specications that also include geographic e¤ects,
further reported in Appendix Table 9c. The implied magnitudes of some of these geographic
e¤ects are quite large and suggest a fruitful and important area for deeper investigation.23
6 Conclusion
Idiosyncratic rm- or industry-level shocks could spread through a network of interconnections
in the economy, propagating and amplifying their initial impact. Though their potential im-
port was initially downplayed because of the belief that their aggregation across many units
(disaggregated industries or rms) would limit their macroeconomic impact, there has been a
recent revival of interest in such network-based propagation of microeconomic shocks. This
paper contributes to an empirical investigation of the role of such propagation, focusing pri-
marily on input-output linkages but also on connections through the geographic collocation
patterns of industries.
One feature that makes propagation through the input-output network particularly at-
tractive for empirical study is that theory places fairly tight restrictions on the form of the
transmission of these e¤ects. In particular, in response to demand-side shocks, upstream
23Following Autor et al. (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2015) estimate an aggregate reduction of over 1.5 million
manufacturing jobs through direct and network e¤ects from the China trade shocks. In terms of our framework,
their estimates correspond to a combination of own e¤ects and geographic spillovers; they also control for
changes in the underlying population in regions in their econometric specication.
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propagation (to the suppliers of the directly a¤ected industries) should be more pronounced
than downstream propagation (to the customers of the directly a¤ected industries), whereas
in response to supply-side shocks, the reverse ordering should hold. In fact, when production
technologies and consumer preferences are Cobb-Douglas, there should only be upstream prop-
agation with demand-side shocks and only downstream propagation with supply-side shocks.
Moreover, the quantitative magnitudes of the direct e¤ects and the downstream/upstream
e¤ects are pinned down by theory.
After reviewing these theoretical basics, we turn to an empirical investigation of the propa-
gation of four di¤erent types of shocks  China import shocks and federal government spend-
ing shocks on the demand side, and TFP and foreign patenting shocks on the supply side.
In each case, we study these shocks rst in isolation and then in combination with the other
shocks, and separately estimate own (direct) e¤ects as well as downstream and upstream e¤ects.
Throughout, our focus is on annual variation, which appears more relevant for the question of
macroeconomic uctuations, though we verify the robustness of our results to lower-frequency
analysis.
Our empirical results paint a fairly uniform pattern across the di¤erent types of shocks.
In each case, the patterns are consistent with theory  in the case of demand-side shocks,
upstream e¤ects strongly overshadow downstream e¤ects, which are often zero or in the oppo-
site direction, and the converse is true with supply-side shocks. Moreover, the theory-implied
quantitative restrictions are often veried, excepting the foreign patenting shocks. Equally
important, we also nd the network-based propagation of shocks to be quantitatively sizable,
and in each case, more important than the direct e¤ect of the shock  sometimes more than
ve times as important. These patterns appear to be fairly robust across specications and
di¤erent control strategies.
In addition to the propagation of shocks through the input-output network, the geographic
spread of economic shocks could potentially be important. For example, many economic trans-
actions, particularly for non-tradables, take place within the local economy (e.g., a county or
commuting zone). If so, a negative shock to an industry concentrated in an area will impact
rms and workers in that area. Though a full analysis of this geographic dimension requires
detailed data with geography/industry breakdown, we also undertake a preliminary investiga-
tion of these linkages by focusing on the collocation patterns of industries. The idea is simple:
if two industries tend to collocate strongly, meaning that wherever one industry plays a major
role in the local economy, the other industry is also likely to be overrepresented, then shocks
to the rst industry will tend to be felt more strongly by this collocating industry than other,
geographically less-connected industries. We derive a theoretical relationship showing how
industry-level shocks spread to other industries depending on collocation patterns and then
empirically investigate this linkage.
Our results in this domain are somewhat less robust, but still indicate a fairly sizable
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impact of the propagation of shocks through the geographic collocation network. In fact,
quantitatively this channel appears to be, if anything, somewhat more important than the
transmission of shocks to the input-output network. Interestingly, however, controlling for this
geographic channel does not attenuate or weaken the evidence we nd for the propagation of
shocks with input-output network.
Though ours is not the rst paper showing that certain shocks spread through the network
of input-output linkages (and also of geographic connections), we still consider our paper as
part of the early phase of this emerging literature documenting the empirical power of network-
based propagation of shocks. Several areas of future work look promising from our vantage
point. First, as already noted, the geographic spread of shocks can be better studied by using
data and empirical methods that cover multiple geographic scales and levels of interaction, and
even better would be to incorporate measures of the geographic span of the operations and
plants of multi-unit rms using the Census Bureaus Longitudinal Business Database.
Second, the input-output network we utilize is still fairly aggregated. The theoretical logic
applies at any level of disaggregation, and even at the level of rms. Though rm input-
output linkages require some care (since many such relations may be non-competitive due to
the presence of relationship-specic investments or holdup problems), the same ideas can also
be extended to the rm-level network of input-output linkages. Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson
(2014) and Atalay, Hortacsu, Roberts and Syverson (2011) take rst steps in constructing such
rm-level networks, which can then be used for studying this type of propagation.
Third, the simple but powerful nature of the theory we have already exploited in this paper
also suggests that more structural approaches could be quite fruitfully applied in this domain,
which will enable more rigorous testing of some of the theoretical predictions of this class of
models. For example, the Leontief inverse matrix also puts a considerable amount of discipline
about the co-movement of value added and employment across industries resulting from shocks
spreading through the input-output network, which can be formally investigated.
Fourth, the role of the input-output and the geographic networks in the propagation of
industry-level (micro) shocks suggests that these networks may also be playing a role in the
amplication of macro shocks  such as aggregate demand, monetary and nancial shocks 
which appears a generally understudied area.
Fifth, the two types of networks we have focused on are by no means the only ones that
may matter for macroeconomic outcomes. Two others that have recently been investigated are
the nancial network, which can lead to the propagation and contagion of shocks hitting some
nancial institutions to the rest of the nancial system (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000, Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015a, Elliott, Golub and Jackson, 2014, Cabrales, Gottardi and
Vega-Redondo, 2014), and the idea/innovation network, which can lead to the spread of new
knowledge, innovations and practices (studied, e.g., in Acemoglu, Akcigit and Kerr, 2015, as
well as indirectly in Bloom et al., 2013). Our decision to abstract from these was partly because
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of our empirical frame, which centers on industry-level shocks, and also because of our focus
on shorter-run uctuations (whereas the propagation of new ideas and innovations through
the innovation network is likely to be more important at ve- or ten-year frequencies or even
longer). Nevertheless, combining these various types of network linkages may be a fruitful area
for future research.
Finally, in addition to the propagation of shocks to other industries or rms, the network
linkages emphasized here can also fundamentally change the nature of macroeconomic outcomes
and their volatility. For example, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2014) show how tail
macroeconomic risk can be created from the propagation of microeconomic shocks through the
input-output network, while Schennach (2013) suggests that these types of network e¤ects
may change the persistence properties of macroeconomic time-series. These new areas also
constitute fruitful directions for future research.
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Figures and Tables
Notes: Figure plots estimated response to a one standard-deviation shock taken in isolation. Trade shocks are presented in positive terms to be visually 
comparable to the other shocks considered. Network effects focus on upstream contributions for the demand-side shocks of trade and federal spending and 
downstream contributions for the productivity shocks of TFP and foreign patenting. Responses are measured through log growth rates per the estimating 
equation and translated into levels off of a base initial level of one. The lag structure for the dependent variables includes three lags.
Figure 1a: Responses to a one standard-deviation shock taken in isolation, value-added
A. Chinese imports (reduction) B. Federal government spending
C. TFP D. Foreign patenting
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Notes: See Figure 1a.
Figure 1b: Responses to a one standard-deviation shock taken in isolation, employment
A. Chinese imports (reduction) B. Federal government spending
C. TFP D. Foreign patenting
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Figure 2: Theoretical examples
A. Complete cycle B. Incomplete cycle
Downstream Leontief
Upstream Leontief
Geographic overlay
China trade shock
Federal spending shock
TFP shock
Foreign patenting shock
Notes: Baseline trade shocks for manufacturing industries are the lagged change in imports from China relative to 1991 US market volume, following Autor et al. (2013). A 
negative value is taken such that positive coefficients correspond to likely beneficial outcomes, similar to other shocks.  All trade analyses instrument US imports with the rise in 
Chinese imports in eight other advanced countries, and this table reports the correlation of the IV component. Baseline federal spending shocks for manufacturing industries are 
the lagged log change in national federal spending interacted with the 1992 share of sales from industries that went to the federal government. Baseline TFP shocks for 
manufacturing industries are the lagged log change in four-factor TFP taken from the NBER Productivity Database. Baseline patent shocks for manufacturing industries are the 
lagged change in USPTO patents filed by overseas inventors associated with the industry. These correlations are presented after year fixed effects are removed from each shock. 
The Correlation Coefficient column presents the average pairwise correlation of the given shock series between any two industries.
Table 1a: Correlation matrix of network interconnections
Notes: Downstream networks represent inputs from supplier industries into the focal industry's production, expressed 
as a share of the focal industry's sales (e.g., rubber inputs into the tire industry as a share of the tire industry's sales). 
Upstream networks represent sales from the focal industry to industrial customers, expressed as a share of the focal 
industry's sales (e.g., sales of tires to car manufacturers as a share of the tire industry's sales). Both networks are 
measured from the 1991 BEA Input-Output Matrix. Shares allow for flows to non-manufacturing industries and 
customers and thus do not sum to 100% within manufacturing. Leontief connections provide the full chain of 
interconnections in the network matrix. Geographic overlay is measured as the sum across regions of the interaction of 
a focal industry's employment share in the region times the share of regional activity for other industries. Regions are 
defined through commuting zones and use 1991 industrial activity from the County Business Patterns database. 
Correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Geographic overlayUpstream LeontiefDownstream Leontief
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Table 1b: Correlation matrix of shocks
-0.023 0.030 0.003 0.003
0.200
0.031 1 0.452
Correlation Coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (5)
1
Foreign patenting shock
(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.019 0.020 0.149*** 0.132*** -0.117*** -0.120***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.033)
Δ Dependent variable t-2 0.047** 0.109*** -0.057
(0.024) (0.020) (0.037)
Δ Dependent variable t-3 0.033 0.089*** -0.002
(0.021) (0.016) (0.033)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.140 -0.124 -0.056 -0.044 -0.100 -0.108
(0.086) (0.081) (0.040) (0.037) (0.099) (0.099)
Upstream effects t-1 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.021 0.021
(0.024) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
Own effects t-1 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 6560 5776 6560 5776 6560 5776
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.071 0.054 0.086 0.139 0.333 0.350
Table 2a: China trade shock analysis
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment Δ Log real labor productivity
Notes: Estimations consider network structures and the propagation of trade shocks. Baseline trade shocks for manufacturing industries are the 
lagged change in imports from China relative to 1991 US market volume, following Autor et al. (2013). A negative value is taken such that positive 
coefficients correspond to likely beneficial outcomes, similar to other shocks. Explanatory variables aggregate these industry-level components by 
the indicated network connecting industries. These network explanatory variables are expressed as lagged changes in non-log values. Downstream 
and upstream flows use the Leontief inverse to provide the full chain of material interconnections within manufacturing. All trade analyses instrument 
the direct and network effects from US imports with the rise in Chinese imports in eight other advanced countries. Upstream=Own test uses the exact 
formula discussed in the text and is calculated through unreported auxiliary regressions. Variables are winsorized at the 0.1% level and initial shocks 
are transformed to have unit standard deviation for interpretation. Estimations include year fixed effects, report standard errors clustered by industry, 
and are unweighted. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
Adding 
resource 
constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.114 -0.008 -0.038* -0.071*** 0.018
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.071) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.025)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.140 -0.022 -0.152* -0.209* 0.000 0.138 0.192 -0.163*
(0.086) (0.083) (0.086) (0.123) (0.109) (0.106) (0.129) (0.092)
Upstream effects t-1 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.078*** 0.075** 0.051** 0.053* 0.051 0.107**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.032) (0.042) (0.042)
Own effects t-1 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.022 0.018** 0.015 0.016 0.032***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.071 0.053 0.076 0.159 0.266 0.489 0.080
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.149*** 0.156*** 0.153*** 0.257*** 0.097*** 0.044** 0.010 0.146***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.056 0.024 -0.055 -0.034 0.009 0.036 0.080 -0.082*
(0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.059) (0.049) (0.054) (0.067) (0.047)
Upstream effects t-1 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.048** 0.029* 0.014 0.012 0.084***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.028)
Own effects t-1 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.009** 0.005 0.001 0.021***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.086 0.069 0.185 0.209 0.616 0.667 0.027
Table 2b: Robustness checks on China trade shock analysis
Notes: See Table 2a.
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.019 0.018 0.158*** 0.135*** -0.117*** -0.119***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030) (0.036)
Δ Dependent variable t-2 0.051** 0.116*** -0.057
(0.023) (0.019) (0.038)
Δ Dependent variable t-3 0.038* 0.102*** -0.002
(0.021) (0.016) (0.035)
Downstream effects t-1 0.017 0.023 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Upstream effects t-1 0.022** 0.020** 0.010* 0.011** 0.012 0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.004 0.008** 0.003 0.006*** 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 6560 5776 6560 5776 6560 5776
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.076 0.191 0.321 0.383 0.147 0.330
Table 3a: Federal spending shock analysis
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment Δ Log real labor productivity
Notes: See Table 2a. Estimations consider network structures and the propagation of federal spending shocks. Baseline federal spending shocks for 
manufacturing industries are the lagged log change in national federal spending interacted with the 1992 share of sales from industries that went to 
the federal government.
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
Adding 
resource 
constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.115* -0.011 -0.042* -0.076*** 0.019
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.068) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.025)
Downstream effects t-1 0.017 0.034* 0.015 0.008 -0.006 0.029 -0.040 0.017
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.024) (0.062) (0.021)
Upstream effects t-1 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.030** 0.012 0.025* 0.069*** 0.022*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.023) (0.012)
Own effects t-1 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.076 0.077 0.027 0.254 0.183 0.031 0.130
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.163*** 0.269*** 0.099*** 0.041** 0.006 0.158***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Downstream effects t-1 0.007 0.021** 0.006 0.007 -0.011 0.018 -0.046 0.009
(0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) (0.046) (0.014)
Upstream effects t-1 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.016*** 0.020* 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Own effects t-1 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.009** 0.022** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.321 0.346 0.156 0.747 0.160 0.829 0.717
Table 3b: Robustness checks on federal spending shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 3a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.024 -0.031 0.141*** 0.118*** -0.194*** -0.211***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.034)
Δ Dependent variable t-2 0.049** 0.118*** -0.071**
(0.023) (0.019) (0.034)
Δ Dependent variable t-3 0.037* 0.102*** -0.008
(0.020) (0.016) (0.032)
Downstream effects t-1 0.060*** 0.047** 0.016* 0.011 0.047*** 0.043**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
Upstream effects t-1 0.024** 0.020* 0.009 0.008 0.015* 0.014
(0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Own effects t-1 0.004 0.007 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.011** 0.013***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 6560 5776 6560 5776 6560 5776
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.005 0.034 0.041 0.161 0.101 0.276
Table 4a: TFP shock analysis
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment Δ Log real labor productivity
Notes: See Table 2a. Estimations consider network structures and the propagation of TFP shocks. Baseline TFP shocks for manufacturing industries 
are the lagged log change in four-factor TFP taken from the NBER Productivity Database.
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.024 -0.002 -0.024 -0.075 -0.080** -0.126*** -0.147***
(0.040) (0.024) (0.040) (0.073) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
Downstream effects t-1 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.077** 0.039* 0.027 0.027
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Upstream effects t-1 0.024** 0.024** 0.025** 0.054*** 0.021* 0.017 0.020
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Own effects t-1 0.004 0.005 0.025* 0.010 0.014** 0.012**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.005 0.007 0.303 0.198 0.623 0.171
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.146*** 0.252*** 0.081*** 0.020 -0.015
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
Downstream effects t-1 0.016* 0.025*** 0.016* 0.024* 0.002 0.011 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Upstream effects t-1 0.009 0.012** 0.009 0.022*** 0.007 0.010 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Own effects t-1 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.041 0.045 0.026 0.712 0.312 0.314
Table 4b: Robustness checks on TFP shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 4a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.020 0.020 0.159*** 0.138*** -0.117*** -0.120***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (0.036)
Δ Dependent variable t-2 0.051** 0.117*** -0.057
(0.023) (0.020) (0.038)
Δ Dependent variable t-3 0.037* 0.100*** -0.003
(0.021) (0.016) (0.035)
Downstream effects t-1 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.028***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Own effects t-1 -0.006 -0.007* -0.008*** -0.006** 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 6543 5761 6543 5761 6543 5761
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.029 0.026
Table 5a: Foreign patent shock analysis
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment Δ Log real labor productivity
Notes: See Table 2a. Estimations consider network structures and the propagation of foreign patent shocks. Baseline patent shocks for manufacturing 
industries are the lagged change in USPTO patents filed by overseas inventors associated with the industry. 
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.120* -0.012 -0.042* -0.075***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.070) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021)
Downstream effects t-1 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.044** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Own effects t-1 -0.006 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.000 0.000 0.354 0.001 0.001 0.000
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.163*** 0.270*** 0.099*** 0.044** 0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.034) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Downstream effects t-1 0.018*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.014* 0.015** 0.014** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.001 0.001 0.238 0.008 0.016 0.023
Table 5b: Robustness checks on foreign patent shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 5a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.045 -0.060 -0.025 -0.011 -0.057 -0.063 0.312*** 0.244**
(0.039) (0.044) (0.027) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.109) (0.098)
Δ Downstream real value added t-1 0.038 -0.036 0.087*** 0.080*** -0.735*** -0.398**
(0.112) (0.116) (0.025) (0.025) (0.268) (0.200)
Δ Upstream real value added t-1 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.113** 0.114** 0.017 -0.162*
(0.059) (0.061) (0.045) (0.052) (0.011) (0.086)
Own shock t-1 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.006** 0.007* 0.009 0.009 -0.012* -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 6168 6168 6560 6560 6560 6560 6543 6543
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.132*** 0.084 0.185*** 0.079 0.089*** 0.081*** 0.310*** 0.268***
(0.023) (0.146) (0.025) (0.080) (0.028) (0.026) (0.059) (0.058)
Δ Downstream employment t-1 0.097 0.158 0.095** 0.091** -0.264*** -0.278***
(0.295) (0.115) (0.041) (0.044) (0.098) (0.099)
Δ Upstream employment t-1 0.053*** 0.035 -0.045* -0.018 0.017 0.085**
(0.014) (0.054) (0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.038)
Own shock t-1 0.026*** 0.022* 0.005** 0.003 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.012*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 6168 6168 6560 6560 6560 6560 6543 6543
Table 6: VAR estimations for intermediated shocks
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Tables 2a-5a. Rather than model network shocks directly, estimations consider intermediated approaches where the shock indicated by the column header 
instruments for changes in upstream and downstream economic activity in terms of real value added or employment. Estimations control for own shock and use two lags of 
upstream and downstream components. In each estimation pair, the first specification considers the focal network element for the shock in question. The second 
specification adds in the non-focal element where the first stage fit can be weak.
China trade Federal spending TFP Foreign patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.043 -0.050 0.125*** 0.105***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.020) (0.020)
Δ Dependent variable t-2 0.040* 0.108***
(0.022) (0.020)
Δ Dependent variable t-3 0.032 0.089***
(0.021) (0.016)
Trade: Downstream effects t-1 -0.059 -0.042 -0.016 0.008
(0.082) (0.080) (0.044) (0.040)
Upstream effects t-1 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.066*** 0.054***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.020) (0.019)
Own effects t-1 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.017***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
Federal: Downstream effects t-1 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 0.001
(0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.014)
Upstream effects t-1 0.035** 0.040*** 0.020** 0.023***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
TFP: Downstream effects t-1 0.062*** 0.051** 0.019* 0.014
(0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Upstream effects t-1 0.030** 0.028** 0.013* 0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.007 0.009 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Patent: Downstream effects t-1 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.017*** 0.016**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
Upstream effects t-1 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 -0.007* -0.007* -0.007*** -0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6543 5761 6543 5761
Table 7: Joint analysis of shocks
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 2a.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.028 -0.047 0.130*** 0.124***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.021) (0.020)
Trade: Geographic effects t-1 0.125*** 0.113*** 0.055*** 0.049***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.018) (0.017)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.048 -0.014
(0.078) (0.045)
Upstream effects t-1 0.095*** 0.061***
(0.029) (0.019)
Own effects t-1 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Federal: Geographic effects t-1 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.046*** 0.040***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.015) (0.014)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.036 -0.018
(0.023) (0.017)
Upstream effects t-1 0.026** 0.017**
(0.012) (0.009)
Own effects t-1 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
TFP: Geographic effects t-1 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.012**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Downstream effects t-1 0.055*** 0.016*
(0.019) (0.010)
Upstream effects t-1 0.024* 0.011
(0.013) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.008 0.007 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Patent: Geographic effects t-1 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Downstream effects t-1 0.039*** 0.016**
(0.011) (0.006)
Upstream effects t-1 0.002 0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 -0.002 -0.006* -0.005** -0.007***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6543 6543 6543 6543
Table 8: Geographic and networks analysis
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 2a. Estimations include additional effects from indicated shocks and the geographic overlay of 
industries. Geographic overlay is measured as the sum across regions of the interaction of a focal industry's 
employment share in the region times the share of regional activity for other industries. Regions are defined through 
commuting zones and use 1991 industrial activity from the County Business Patterns database. 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1. Let us set government purchases equal to zero for this part of the proof. Recall that
prot maximization implies
aij =
pjxij
piyi
; and li =
wli
piyi
: (A1)
Utility maximization in turn yields
pici
i
=
pjcj
j
: (A2)
Since total household income is equal to labor income and in this part we have no government
purchases, we also have
nX
i=1
pici = wl;
which yields
pici = iwl; 8i: (A3)
Moreover, the rst-order condition for labor supply implies
 
0(l)l
(l)
= 1;
and thus labor supply is determined independent of the equilibrium wage rate because given
the preferences in (3), income and substitutions cancel out.
Let us now take logs in (1) and totally di¤erentiate to obtain
d ln yi = dzi + 
l
id ln li +
nX
j=1
aijd lnxij : (A4)
Let us next totally di¤erentiate (A1) to obtain
d ln yi + d ln pi = d lnxij + d ln pj ;
and
d ln yi + d ln pi = d ln li;
where we have made use of the fact that the wages are chosen as the numeraire and thus
d lnw = 0. Substituting these two equations into (A4), we have
d ln yi = dzi + 
l
i(d ln yi + d ln pi) +
nX
j=1
aij(d ln yi + d ln pi   d ln pj):
Next recalling that l remains constant, di¤erentiating (A2) and (A3), and combining with the
previous two equations to eliminate prices, we obtain
d ln yi = dzi + 
l
i(d ln yi   d ln ci) +
nX
j=1
aij(d ln yi   d ln ci + d ln cj):
Noting that li +
nX
j=1
aij = 1, this simplies to
d ln ci = dzi +
nX
j=1
aijd ln cj ;
which can be rewritten in matrix form as
d ln c = dz + Ad ln c
where d ln c and dz are the vectors of d ln ci and dzi respectively, which is a unique solution
given by
d ln c = (I A) 1 dz; (A5)
in view of the fact that the largest eigenvalue of A is less than 1. Next combining (2) and
(A1), we have
yj
cj
= 1 +
nX
i=1
aij
iyi
jci
;
which implies that
d ln y = d ln c: (A6)
Then combining (A5) with (A6) we obtain
d ln y = (I A) 1 dz: (A7)
This yields the desired result, (6).
Part 2. Normalize z = 0 for this part of the proof. Consider the unit cost function of
sector i, which is
Ci (p; w) = Biw
li
nY
j=1
p
aij
j ;
where
Bi =

1
li
li nY
j=1

1
aij
aij
Zero prot condition for producer i implies
ln pi = lnBi + 
l
i lnw +
nX
j=1
aij ln pj for all i 2 f1; ::; ng :
Since the wage is the numeraire (i.e., w = 1), we have li lnw = 0 and these equations dene an
n equation system in n prices (for a given vector of productivities z, in this instance normalized
to 1), with solution
ln p = (I A) 1 b;
where b is the vector with entries given by lnBi.
This shows that, for a given vector of productivities, the equilibrium price vector is uniquely
determined regardless of the value of the vector of government purchases G. Thus demand-
side shocks have no impact on equilibrium prices, which are entirely determined by the supply
side. But then from (A3), the consumption vector remains unchanged, and from (2), total
net supply of all sectors has to remain constant regardless of the change in G. We can then
obtain the change in the total production in the economy using (2) combined with (A1) and
(A2), which with unchanged prices simply implies
d ln yi = d lnxij and d ln yi = d ln li:
Household maximization implies that, even though prices are xed, labor supply will change
because of changes in consumption (resulting from government purchases). In particular, the
following rst-order condition determines the representative households labor supply
wl
wl   T =  
l0 (l)
 (l)
;
with T =
nX
i=1
piGi.
When  (l) = (1  l), using the fact that the wage, w, is chosen as the numeraire, we
obtain
l =
1 + 
nX
i=1
piGi
1 + 
:
Therefore, we have that
pici = i [lw   T ]
=
i
1 + 
241  nX
j=1
pjGj
35
which implies
d(pici) =   i
(1 + )
nX
j=1
d(pjGj):
The resource constraint then implies:
dyi = dci +
nX
j=1
dxji + dGi:
Combining the previous two equations with (A1),
d(piyi)
piyi
=
nX
j=1
aji
d(pjyj)
piyi
+
dGi
yi
  i
(1 + )
nX
j=1
(dpjGj)
piyi
=
nX
j=1
a^ji
d(pjyj)
pjyj
+
d ~Gi
piyi
  i
(1 + )
nX
j=1
d ~Gj
piyi
; (A8)
where ~Gj = pjGj . Writing this in matrix form and noting that, because prices are constant,
d(piyi)
piyi
= d ln yi, we have
d ln y = A^Td ln y + d ~G
=

I  A^T
 1
d ~G
= H^Td ~G
where H^ =

I  A^
 1
, ~G is the vector of nominal government spending levels, the ~Gs,
A^ =
0BBBBB@
a^11 a^12 :::
a^21 a^22
. . .
a^nn
1CCCCCA ;
with entries a^ij =
xij
yj
, and
 =
0BBBBBBBB@

1  1(1+)

1
p1y1
  1(1+) 1p1y1 :::
  2(1+) 1p2y2

1  2(1+)

1
p2y2
. . . 
1  n(1+)

1
pnyn
1CCCCCCCCA
: (A9)
Carrying out the second matrix multiplication, this can also be written as
d ln y = H^T
0BBBBB@
d ~G1
p1y1
  1(1+) 1p1y1
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj
d ~G2
p2y2
  2(1+) 1p2y2
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj
:
:
:
1CCCCCA ;
or with one more round of matrix multiplication, as
d ln yi =
nX
j=1
h^ji
1
pjyj
 
d ~Gj  
j
1 + 
nX
k=1
d ~Gk
!
:
Rearranging this equation yields (7).
We also note that the e¤ects of demand-side shocks can be alternatively expressed (without
the division by piyi in equation (A8)) in level, rather than log, changes as
d~y = HT
0BBBBB@
d ~G1   1(1+)
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj
d ~G2   2(1+)
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj
:
:
:
1CCCCCA ; (A10)
which is the general form of the expressions used in Example 2.
Appendix B: Supplemental Figures and Tables
E. Federal government spending, value added
Notes: See Figure 1a. Figure plots estimated intermediated network effects akin to a VAR analysis. Estimations use upstream and 
downstream shocks in instrumental variable specifications where the endogenous regressor is the lagged actual value-added or 
employment change in the network. Results with foreign patenting and employment for federal spending are excluded.
Appendix Figure 1: VAR responses to a one standard-deviation shock taken in isolation
A. Chinese imports (reduction), value added B. Chinese imports (reduction), employment
C. TFP, value added D. TFP, employment
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Notes: See Figure 1a. Figure plots estimated response to joint one-time standard-deviation shocks. Panels A and B exclude foreign patenting, which has a 
negative own effect, while Panels C and D include it.
Appendix Figure 2: Combined response to joint one standard-deviation shocks
A. Value-added, without foreign patenting B. Employment, without foreign patenting
C. Value-added, with foreign patenting D. Employment, with foreign patenting
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Own + network effects 
Own effects 
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Notes: See Figures 1a and Appendix Figure 2. Figure plots estimated response to joint one-time standard-deviation shocks that includes geographic effects. 
Appendix Figure 3: Combined response to joint one standard-deviation shocks with geographic effects
A. Value-added, without foreign patenting B. Employment, without foreign patenting
C. Value-added, with foreign patenting D. Employment, with foreign patenting
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Downstream 
effects t-1
Upstream 
effects t-1 Own effects t-1
Downstream 
effects t-1
Upstream 
effects t-1 Own effects t-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Log real value added t-1 -0.012*** -0.014 -0.008 -0.013*** -0.015 -0.023
(0.004) (0.010) (0.084) (0.005) (0.011) (0.082)
Δ Log real value added t-2 -0.004 0.032** -0.027
(0.005) (0.015) (0.068)
Δ Log real value added t-3 -0.005 0.004 -0.018
(0.005) (0.013) (0.080)
IV Downstream effects t-1 0.638*** 0.101** 0.832** 0.640*** 0.110** 0.835**
(0.041) (0.044) (0.368) (0.041) (0.045) (0.364)
IV Upstream effects t-1 0.005 0.886*** -0.244** 0.005 0.879*** -0.237***
(0.009) (0.045) (0.076) (0.009) (0.045) (0.077)
IV Own effects t-1 -0.001 -0.008*** 0.461*** -0.001 -0.009*** 0.458***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.075) (0.002) (0.003) (0.073)
Shea's Partial R-Squared 0.361 0.514 0.224 0.360 0.509 0.222
Appendix Table 1: First-stage relationships for Chinese imports instruments
Notes: See Table 2a.
Real value-added growth, one lag Real value-added growth, three lags
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
Adding 
resource 
constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.176*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.332*** 0.140*** 0.103*** 0.061*** 0.173***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.065) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.140** -0.067 -0.147** -0.186** -0.025 0.084 0.128 -0.176
(0.059) (0.055) (0.060) (0.091) (0.076) (0.076) (0.098) (0.067)
Upstream effects t-1 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.045* 0.034* 0.033 0.031 0.098***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.026) (0.035) (0.037)
Own effects t-1 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.068 0.053 0.143 0.154 0.272 0.460 0.027
Appendix Table 2a: Robustness checks on China trade shock analysis using real shipments growth
Notes: See Table 2a.
Δ Log real shipments
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Downstream effects t-1 -0.146* -0.116 -0.086 -0.056 -0.026 0.004 0.034 0.065 0.095 0.125 0.155*
(0.087) (0.083) (0.080) (0.078) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) (0.080)
Upstream effects t-1 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.043** 0.039** 0.035*
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Own effects t-1 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.073 -0.062 -0.050 -0.038 -0.027 -0.015 -0.003 0.008 0.020 0.032 0.043
(0.046) (0.042) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.042)
Upstream effects t-1 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.024** 0.019** 0.014 0.010
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Own effects t-1 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 2a. Estimations impose the psi parameter for the lagged dependent variable dependence given in the column header.
Appendix Table 2b: Variations in psi parameter for China trade shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
Baseline annual 
analysis
Using two-year 
periods
Using three-
year periods
Using four-year 
periods
Using five-year 
periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.019 0.085** 0.092* 0.027 0.072
(0.025) (0.037) (0.047) (0.056) (0.076)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.140 -0.323*** -0.417** -1.549*** -1.092
(0.086) (0.120) (0.198) (0.348) (0.671)
Upstream effects t-1 0.076*** 0.089*** 0.149*** 0.292*** 0.719***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.067) (0.175)
Own effects t-1 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.087*** 0.118*** 0.153***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.029) (0.054)
Observations 6560 3080 1920 1152 768
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.071 0.035 0.093 0.005 0.001
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.149*** 0.242*** 0.284*** 0.266*** 0.297***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.041) (0.047) (0.058)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.056 -0.041 -0.207*** -0.055 0.685*
(0.040) (0.058) (0.076) (0.221) (0.408)
Upstream effects t-1 0.049*** 0.063*** 0.100*** 0.215*** 0.655***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.060) (0.160)
Own effects t-1 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.067*** 0.102*** 0.111***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.027) (0.039)
Observations 6560 3080 1920 1152 768
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.086 0.138 0.172 0.066 0.001
Appendix Table 2c: Longer changes on China trade shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 2a. All sample periods start with 1991 and extend as far as data allow. For example, Column 5 effectively 
considers 1996-2001 and 2001-2006, with lags extending back to 1991-1996. 
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
Adding 
resource 
constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.184*** 0.334*** 0.138*** 0.101*** 0.058*** 0.178***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.061) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.002 0.019 -0.003 -0.002 -0.022 0.011 -0.025 0.000
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.046) (0.018)
Upstream effects t-1 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.024** 0.013* 0.024* 0.055*** 0.017*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010)
Own effects t-1 0.005* 0.004* 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.063 0.065 0.019 0.304 0.211 0.055 0.259
Notes: See Table 3a.
Appendix Table 3a: Robustness checks on federal spending shock analysis using real shipments growth
Δ Log real shipments
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Downstream effects t-1 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.000
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Upstream effects t-1 0.022** 0.020** 0.018** 0.017** 0.015** 0.013** 0.011** 0.009** 0.007** 0.005* 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Downstream effects t-1 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Upstream effects t-1 0.011 0.010* 0.009* 0.009* 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 0.006* 0.005* 0.004* 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002* 0.002** 0.002***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 3a. Estimations impose the psi parameter for the lagged dependent variable dependence given in the column header.
Appendix Table 3b: Variations in psi parameter for federal spending shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
Baseline annual 
analysis
Using two-year 
periods
Using three-
year periods
Using four-year 
periods
Using five-year 
periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.019 0.094** 0.114** 0.083 0.138*
(0.025) (0.037) (0.048) (0.059) (0.072)
Downstream effects t-1 0.017 0.031 0.094* 0.197** 0.122
(0.021) (0.033) (0.054) (0.095) (0.130)
Upstream effects t-1 0.022** 0.020 0.037* 0.056 -0.009
(0.009) (0.014) (0.021) (0.039) (0.051)
Own effects t-1 0.004 0.013*** 0.023** 0.011 0.017
(0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 6560 3080 1920 1152 768
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.076 0.634 0.569 0.286 0.657
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.158*** 0.264*** 0.332*** 0.346*** 0.379***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.040) (0.047) (0.054)
Downstream effects t-1 0.007 0.029 0.051 0.044 0.176*
(0.015) (0.021) (0.032) (0.044) (0.102)
Upstream effects t-1 0.010* 0.018** 0.040*** 0.063*** -0.025
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.023) (0.036)
Own effects t-1 0.003 0.006* 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013)
Observations 6560 3080 1920 1152 768
p-value: Upstream=Own 0.321 0.214 0.088 0.103 0.144
Appendix Table 3c: Longer changes on federal spending shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 3a. 
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.226*** 0.164*** 0.231*** 0.307*** 0.168*** 0.122*** 0.088***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.045) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Downstream effects t-1 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.037** 0.026* 0.026*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Upstream effects t-1 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.039*** 0.008 0.004 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Own effects t-1 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.007* -0.005 -0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.014 0.134 0.008
Appendix Table 4a: Robustness checks on TFP shock analysis using real shipments growth
Δ Log real shipments
Notes: See Table 4a.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Downstream effects t-1 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.050** 0.045** 0.040* 0.035 0.031 0.026 0.021 0.017 0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Upstream effects t-1 0.023** 0.021* 0.019* 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Own effects t-1 0.002 -0.011*** -0.023*** -0.035*** -0.047*** -0.059*** -0.072*** -0.084*** -0.096*** -0.108*** -0.120***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Downstream effects t-1 0.018* 0.017* 0.016* 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Upstream effects t-1 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.004** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Appendix Table 4b: Variations in psi parameter for TFP shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 4a. Estimations impose the psi parameter for the lagged dependent variable dependence given in the column header.
Baseline annual 
analysis
Using two-year 
periods
Using three-
year periods
Using four-year 
periods
Using five-year 
periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.024 0.067 0.157*** 0.123* 0.125*
(0.040) (0.047) (0.056) (0.069) (0.068)
Downstream effects t-1 0.060*** 0.189*** 0.118* 0.253*** 0.269**
(0.020) (0.047) (0.067) (0.089) (0.104)
Upstream effects t-1 0.024** 0.033 0.041 -0.055 -0.077
(0.011) (0.021) (0.036) (0.050) (0.056)
Own effects t-1 0.004 -0.004 -0.027 -0.032 -0.016
(0.007) (0.013) (0.022) (0.031) (0.037)
Observations 6560 3080 1920 1152 768
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.005 0.000 0.092 0.006 0.025
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.141*** 0.252*** 0.336*** 0.349*** 0.363***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.042) (0.047) (0.054)
Downstream effects t-1 0.016* 0.015 -0.016 0.032 0.053
(0.009) (0.022) (0.027) (0.036) (0.053)
Upstream effects t-1 0.009 0.017 0.021 -0.069** -0.099**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.018) (0.033) (0.039)
Own effects t-1 0.006*** 0.006 -0.004 -0.011 -0.016
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Observations 6560 3080 1920 1152 768
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.041 0.485 0.690 0.169 0.217
Appendix Table 4c: Longer changes on TFP shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 4a. 
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.342*** 0.139*** 0.103*** 0.060***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.063) (0.027) (0.025) (0.021)
Downstream effects t-1 0.022*** 0.019** 0.022*** 0.025 0.019** 0.017** 0.018**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Upstream effects t-1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Own effects t-1 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.015 0.021 0.683 0.039 0.057 0.025
Appendix Table 5a: Robustness checks on foreign patent shock analysis using real shipments growth
Δ Log real shipments
Notes: See Table 5a.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Downstream effects t-1 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.032** 0.030** 0.028** 0.026* 0.024
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Own effects t-1 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Downstream effects t-1 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 5a. Estimations impose the psi parameter for the lagged dependent variable dependence given in the column header.
Appendix Table 5b: Variations in psi parameter for foreign patenting shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
Baseline annual 
analysis
Using two-year 
periods
Using three-
year periods
Using four-year 
periods
Using five-year 
periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.020 0.099*** 0.113** 0.075 0.133*
(0.025) (0.038) (0.050) (0.060) (0.071)
Downstream effects t-1 0.043*** -0.032 0.040 0.088 -0.012
(0.011) (0.023) (0.034) (0.064) (0.067)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.000 -0.020** -0.013 0.004 0.014
(0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.021)
Own effects t-1 -0.006 0.012 -0.015 0.044* 0.004
(0.004) (0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.033)
Observations 6543 3072 1915 1149 766
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.000 0.051 0.144 0.902 0.592
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.159*** 0.265*** 0.330*** 0.324*** 0.347***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.041) (0.046) (0.053)
Downstream effects t-1 0.018*** 0.005 0.046** 0.104*** 0.039
(0.006) (0.012) (0.023) (0.037) (0.048)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.001 -0.011** -0.009 0.005 0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015)
Own effects t-1 -0.008*** -0.002 -0.022** -0.006 -0.006
(0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.030)
Observations 6543 3072 1915 1149 766
p-value: Downstream=Own 0.001 0.890 0.030 0.055 0.616
Appendix Table 5c: Longer changes on foreign patent shock analysis
A. Δ Log real value added
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 5a.
Δ Log real 
value added
Δ Log nominal 
value added
Δ Log real 
shipments
Δ Log nominal 
shipments
Δ Log real 
value added
Δ Log nominal 
value added
Δ Log real 
shipments
Δ Log nominal 
shipments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.019 0.034* 0.176*** 0.201*** 0.019 0.034* 0.178*** 0.201***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.019)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.140 -0.013 -0.140** -0.025 0.017 0.014 -0.002 -0.004
(0.086) (0.073) (0.059) (0.050) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
Upstream effects t-1 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.022** 0.020** 0.022*** 0.019**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.004 0.003 0.005* 0.004
(0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560
Δ Log real 
value added
Δ Log nominal 
value added
Δ Log real 
shipments
Δ Log nominal 
shipments
Δ Log real 
value added
Δ Log nominal 
value added
Δ Log real 
shipments
Δ Log nominal 
shipments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.024 0.058** 0.226*** 0.246*** 0.020 0.032 0.181*** 0.201***
(0.040) (0.029) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020)
Downstream effects t-1 0.060*** 0.018 0.054*** 0.026** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.022*** 0.018**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Upstream effects t-1 0.024** 0.039*** 0.012 0.031*** -0.000 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.008**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 0.004 -0.008** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.006 -0.011*** -0.003 -0.007**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6543 6543 6543 6543
TFP shocks Foreign patenting shocks
Appendix Table 6, continued
Appendix Table 6: Comparison of alternatives to real value added growth
Notes: See Tables 2a-5a.
China trade shocks Federal spending shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Include 3 lags of DV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include 3 lags of own shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include 3 lags of network shocks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2a: Imports
Downstream effects -0.124 -0.121 -0.191* -0.225** -0.044 -0.040 -0.034 -0.065*
Upstream effects 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.043***
Own effects 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.046*** 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.018*** 0.032***
Table 3a: Federal Spending
Downstream effects 0.023 0.023 0.042* 0.036* 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.015
Upstream effects 0.020** 0.020** 0.018** 0.018** 0.011** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.013***
Own effects 0.008** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
Table 4a: TFP
Downstream effects 0.047** 0.048** 0.085** 0.087** 0.011 0.012 -0.005 -0.003
Upstream effects 0.020* 0.019* 0.017 0.017 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.014*
Own effects 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.007*** 0.005* 0.007*** 0.006*
Table 5a: Foreign Patent
Downstream effects 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.037* 0.030 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.022** 0.021**
Upstream effects 0.000 0.001 -0.014** -0.014** -0.000 0.000 -0.009** -0.009**
Own effects -0.007* 0.001 -0.007* 0.003 -0.006** -0.004 -0.006** -0.005
Appendix Table 7: Summed coefficients over deeper lags
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment
Notes: Table documents the sum of coefficients across variations of lag structure. Columns 1 and 5 are baseline specifications from respective 
tables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.040 -0.048 0.126*** 0.105***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.020) (0.020)
Δ Dependent variable t-2 0.041* 0.108***
(0.022) (0.020)
Δ Dependent variable t-3 0.033 0.090***
(0.021) (0.016)
Trade: Downstream effects t-1 -0.042 -0.025 -0.006 0.017
(0.083) (0.081) (0.043) (0.040)
Upstream effects t-1 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.065*** 0.054***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.020) (0.020)
Own effects t-1 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.016***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
Federal: Downstream effects t-1 -0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.003
(0.024) (0.025) (0.017) (0.014)
Upstream effects t-1 0.036** 0.041*** 0.021** 0.023***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
TFP: Downstream effects t-1 0.061*** 0.049** 0.019* 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Upstream effects t-1 0.029** 0.027** 0.013* 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.007 0.009 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6560 5776 6560 5776
Appendix Table 8: Joint analysis without foreign patenting shocks
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 7.
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.028 0.009 -0.027 -0.065 -0.074* -0.120*** -0.139***
(0.040) (0.023) (0.040) (0.070) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Trade: Geographic effects t-1 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.068** 0.090*** 0.074** 0.047
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Own effects t-1 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.020* 0.020** 0.020** 0.023*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Federal: Geographic effects t-1 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.063** 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.012
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Own effects t-1 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
TFP: Geographic effects t-1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.011* 0.025*** 0.022** 0.018**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Own effects t-1 0.008 0.008 0.031** 0.011* 0.015** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Patent: Geographic effects t-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Own effects t-1 -0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 6543 6560 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543
Appendix Table 9a: Robustness checks on joint geographic analysis
Notes: See Table 8.
A. Δ Log real value added
Baseline 
estimation
Excluding 
own lagged 
shock
Weighting by 
1991 log value 
added
Weighting by 
1991 
employees
Adding SIC2 
fixed effects
Adding SIC3 
fixed effects
Adding SIC4 
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.130*** 0.156*** 0.135*** 0.240*** 0.081*** 0.020 -0.019
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Trade: Geographic effects t-1 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.030** 0.027* 0.030* 0.036**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Own effects t-1 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.011*** 0.007* 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Federal: Geographic effects t-1 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.027*** 0.022* 0.021 0.010
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Own effects t-1 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.009** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
TFP: Geographic effects t-1 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.008* 0.009* 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Own effects t-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Patent: Geographic effects t-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Own effects t-1 -0.005** -0.005** -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6543 6560 6543 6543 6543 6543 6543
Appendix Table 9a, continued
B. Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 8.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.017 -0.013 -0.024 0.021 0.020
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.040) (0.025) (0.025)
Trade: Geographic effects t-1 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.142*
(0.086)
Upstream effects t-1 0.076***
(0.024)
Own effects t-1 0.032*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.009)
Federal: Geographic effects t-1 0.021** 0.018**
(0.009) (0.009)
Downstream effects t-1 0.005
(0.021)
Upstream effects t-1 0.018**
(0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
TFP: Geographic effects t-1 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Downstream effects t-1 0.060***
(0.020)
Upstream effects t-1 0.023**
(0.011)
Own effects t-1 0.007 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Patent: Geographic effects t-1 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Downstream effects t-1 0.041***
(0.011)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.001
(0.004)
Own effects t-1 -0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6543 6543
Appendix Table 9b: Geographic effects and networks analysis with single shocks
Notes: See Table 8.
Δ Log real value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.159*** 0.159***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Trade: Geographic effects t-1 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.059
(0.041)
Upstream effects t-1 0.049***
(0.016)
Own effects t-1 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005)
Federal: Geographic effects t-1 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Downstream effects t-1 0.005
(0.014)
Upstream effects t-1 0.009
(0.006)
Own effects t-1 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
TFP: Geographic effects t-1 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Downstream effects t-1 0.016*
(0.009)
Upstream effects t-1 0.009
(0.006)
Own effects t-1 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Patent: Geographic effects t-1 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Downstream effects t-1 0.018***
(0.006)
Upstream effects t-1 -0.001
(0.003)
Own effects t-1 -0.006** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6560 6543 6543
Appendix Table 9b, continued
Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 8.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Dependent variable t-1 -0.052 -0.055 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.020) (0.019)
Δ Dependent variable t-2 0.032 0.033 0.106*** 0.106***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Δ Dependent variable t-3 0.022 0.023 0.089*** 0.088***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
Trade: Geographic effects t-1 0.193*** 0.147*** 0.074*** 0.066***
(0.044) (0.039) (0.021) (0.019)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.006 -0.027 0.021 0.012
(0.076) (0.076) (0.041) (0.041)
Upstream effects t-1 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.048** 0.049***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019)
Own effects t-1 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Federal: Geographic effects t-1 0.178*** 0.134*** 0.063*** 0.055***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.019) (0.017)
Downstream effects t-1 -0.048* -0.041* -0.012 -0.012
(0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015)
Upstream effects t-1 0.028** 0.030** 0.020** 0.020**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
TFP: Geographic effects t-1 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Downstream effects t-1 0.040** 0.043** 0.009 0.010
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
Upstream effects t-1 0.015 0.019 0.006 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Own effects t-1 0.008 0.009 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Patent: Geographic effects t-1 0.005*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Downstream effects t-1 0.040*** 0.016**
(0.011) (0.007)
Upstream effects t-1 0.002 0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
Own effects t-1 -0.006 -0.006**
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 5776 5761 5776 5761
Appendix Table 9c: Joint estimates with three lags of dependent variable
Δ Log real value added Δ Log employment
Notes: See Table 2a.
Appendix C: Omitted Proofs and Results and Monte Carlo Ex-
ercises
Details for Example 1
The expressions and Example 1 follow readily from equation (6) in the text or equation (A7) in
Appendix A. We provide the detailed algebra here for completeness and verication. Suppose,
for this purpose and without loss of any generality, that u(c1; c2; c3; l) = (l)
3Q
i=1
c
1=3
i (since in
this case preference heterogeneity does not matter). Recall that the production function for
sector i 2 f1; 2; 3g is:
yi = e
zi l
li
i x
aij
ij : (C1)
In what follows, we denote the supplier of the focal sector i by j and the customer of i by
k (for instance, fi; j; kg = f1; 2; 3g ; fi; j; kg = f2; 3; 1g ; and fi; j; kg = f3; 1; 2g). With this
convention, the resource market clearing condition can be written as
yi = ci + xki:
Combining the rst-order conditions of the representative household and rms to eliminate
prices, we can write
aij =
cixij
cjyi
and li =
3cili
yi
: (C2)
Substituting this expression into (C1) we obtain
ci = e
zi
ijc
aij
j ; (C3)
where 
ij 
 
li
li aaijij 3 li for i = 1; 2; 3. Solving these three equations summarized in (C3)
jointly, we have
ci = ~
ie
i (C4)
where
i  zi + zjaij + zcaijajk
1  aijajkaki ;
and ~
i is a constant: Using the production functions (C1) and optimal labor choices (C2) and
the equilibrium consumption choices (C4), we can express express yi in terms of its intermediate
input use, xij , only. Then combining these with the resource constraints we obtain
yi = ~
ie
i + yke
lkk zk
1 l
k
k  i;
where the  is denote constants. Solving this system of equations gives:
yi = e
i
h
~
i + ~
k k + ~
j j k
i
1   i j k :
Finally, taking the logs and di¤erentiating this expression delivers the desired result:
d ln yi =
dzi + aijdzj + aijajkdzc
1  aijajkaki for each i = 1; 2; 3:
Details for Example 2
Once again the expressions in Example 2 follow from our general results, in particular equation
(A10) in Appendix A (recalling that in this case u(c1; c2; c3; l) = (l)
3Q
i=1
c
1=3
i ). Once again we
provide the algebraic detail for completeness. Note that the unit cost functions for the three
sectors can be written as
Ci (p; w) = iw
lip
aij
j ;
where i 

li
aij
aij
+

aij
li
li
. In equilibrium, we have
pi = Ci (p; w) = iw
lip
aij
j : (C5)
Using the fact that the wage is the numeraire, we can solve for the price system in (C5) as
pi = 
1
1 aijajkaki ;
where   iaijj 
aijajk
k ; conrming our general results that prices are constant regardless of
demand shocks. Given this constancy, we switch to working with nominal values, which we
denote by a tilde, ~. Then the resource constraint implies
d~yi = d~ci + d~xki + d ~Gi:
Using the rst-order condition of rms, aij =
~xij
~yi
, we have
d~xij = aijd~yi:
Combining this with the resource constraint, we obtain
d~yi = d~ci + akid~yk + d ~Gi: (C6)
Recall that the household optimization implies
~ci =
1
(1 + ) 3
 
~Gi + ~Gj + ~Gk
(1 + ) 3
:
Di¤erentiating this expression yields
d~ci =  d
~Gj + d ~Gi + ~Gk
(1 + ) 3
: (C7)
Combining (C7) in (C6), we arrive at the system of equation (for i = 1; 2; 3):
d~yi =  d
~Gi + d ~Gj + ~Gk
(1 + ) 3
+ akid~yk + d ~Gi:
Solving this system of equations delivers the desired result:
d~yi =
1
1  aijajkaki
(
d ~Gi + akiajkd ~Gj + akid ~Gk
 (1+aki+akiajk)(1+)3
h
d ~Gi + d ~Gj + d ~Gk
i ) :
The Long and Plosser (1983) Model
Long and Plossers (1983) model is closely related to the one we studied in the main text, with
the main di¤erence that there is a one period delay in production, so that inputs dated t  1
produce output dated t, which implies that shocks spread across industries only slowly. More
specically, the production function for sector i at time t is
yi;t = e
zi;t l
li
i;t 1
nY
j=1
x
aij
ij;t 1: (C8)
The Long-Plosser model also includes capital, from which we abstract to simplify the discussion
here. We also assume that the government budget has to be balanced at each date.
The preferences of the representative household are now dened over sequences of con-
sumption bundles as
1X
t=0
t
"
ln (lt) + i
nX
i=1
ln ci;t
#
;
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor.1 The representative household can save using a risk-free
asset, with gross interest rate Rt at time t (meaning that one dollar invested at time t   1
in this risk-free asset pays Rt dollars for sure at time t), and because there is no capital, this
asset must be in zero net supply.
Since there is no capital, the resource constraint takes the same form as in the static
economy:
yi;t = ci;t +
nX
j=1
xji;t +Gi;t 1; (C9)
where we have adopted the timing convention that government spending decisions from time
t  1 are implemented at time t.
An equilibrium is now dened as sequence of prices such that markets at each date clear.
The equilibrium in this dynamic model continues to be very tractable and can be represented
by a log-linear equation for the evolution of sectoral outputs as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition C1 In the dynamic Long-Plosser model:
1. The equilibrium evolution of sectoral outputs in the presence of technology shocks (and
no government spending shocks) is given by
d ln yt+1 = A d ln yt + dzt+1: (C10)
2. Suppose that Suppose (l) = (1   l). Then the equilibrium evolution of sectoral output
in the presence of government spending shocks (and no technology shocks) is given by
d~yt+1 =
 
I AT  1  Pnj=1 d ~Gj;t
1 + 
 + d ~Gt
!
; (C11)
where ~Gt is the vector of nominal government spending across sectors at time t, and ~yt
denotes the vector of nominal sectoral output at time t.
1Di¤erently from the static model, the utility function is no longer invariant to monotone transformations,
thus Cobb-Douglas and log preferences are no longer equivalent, and we adopt the standard log preferences used
by Long and Plosser (1983).
Proof. Part 1. Since there is no capital, the prot maximization of sector i at time t can
be written as
max
li;t;xij;t
8<:pi;t+1Rt ezi;t+1 llii;t
nY
j=1
x
ij
ij;t   wtli;t  
nX
j=1
pj;txij;t
9=; ; (C12)
where output prices are discounted by the gross interest rate between dates t and t + 1, Rt,
because they accrue with one period delay. Consider the dual of this problem, which gives the
unit cost function for sector i as
Ci;t+1 (pt; wt) = e
 zi;t+1Biw
li
t
nY
j=1
p
aij
j;t ;
where Bi 

1=li
li nY
j=1
h
1
aij
iaij
: In the competitive equilibrium, we have
pi;t+1
Rt
= e zi;t+1Biw
li
t
nY
j=1
p
aij
j;t
to ensure zero prots (recall that Rt is known at time t). Given the interest rates representing
intertemporal prices, we can set wages in each period as the numeraire, i.e., wt = 1 for all t,
and taking logs, we arrive at
ln pi;t+1   lnRt =  zi;t+1 + lnBi +
nX
j=1
aij ln pj;t: (C13)
The representative households problem can be represented as
E0
1X
t=0
t
8<:ln  (lt) +
nX
j=1
i ln ci;t + t
24RtAt + wtlt  At+1   nX
j=1
pi;tci;t
359=; ;
where the term in square brackets is the ow dynamic budget constraint of the household, with
At denoting asset holdings, and t is the Lagrange multiplier or the marginal value of income
at time t. This problem has the familiar rst-order conditions given by
ci;t :
i
pi;tci;t
= t =) lni   ln ci;t   lnt = ln pi;t (C14)
At+1 :  tt + t+1RtEtt+1 = 0 (C15)
lt :
0 (lt)
 (lt)
+ twt = 0 (C16)
Combining (C13) and (C14), we obtain
lni   ln ci;t+1   lnEtt+1   lnRt =  zi;t+1 + lnBi +
nX
j=1
aij

lnj   ln cj;t   lnt

or
d ln ci;t+1 + d lnEtt+1 + d lnRt = dzi;t+1 +
nX
j=1
aij [d ln cj;t + d lnt] (C17)
Because the risk-free asset is in zero net supply, we must have At = 0 for all t, so that from
the representative households budget constraint
ltwt =
pi;tci;t
i
=
pj;tcj;t
j
(C18)
for all i; j and t. Combining this equation with (C14), we obtain
t =
1
lt
; (C19)
which together with (C16) implies
1 =   lt
0 (lt)
 (lt)
;
and thus
lt = l
 for all t. (C20)
Finally combining this result with (C15) and (C19), we obtain that, regardless of the realization
of the stochastic shocks,
t = 
 and Rt =
1

:
This equation, combined with (C17) gives the law of motion of consumption of the output of
di¤erent sectors as
d ln ci;t+1 =
nX
j=1
aijd ln cj;t + dzi;t+1;
or as
d ln ct+1 = A d ln ct + dzt+1: (C21)
Consider next the rst-order conditions of the prot-maximization problem, (C12):
aij
pi;t+1
Rt
yi;t+1 = pj;txij;t: (C22)
Using this expression for substituting for xji;t in the resource constraint, (C9), using the fact
that in this part, Gi;t 1 = 0, and rearranging, we obtain:
1 =
ci;t
yi;t
+ 
nX
j=1
aji
pj;t+1yj;t+1
pi;tyi;t
;
and nally, since from (C18) pi;tci;ti = l
, this equation can be written as
i
yi;t
ci;t
= i + 
nX
j=1
ajij
yj;t+1
cj;t+1
;
or dening  i;t  i yi;tci;t and denoting the vector of  i;ts by  t, as
 t = +A
T t+1:
Substituting this equation forward, we obtain
 t = +A
T+2
 
AT
2
 + :::+K
 
AT
K
 t+K :
Because As largest eigenvalue is less than 1 in absolute value, as K ! 1, the last term
converges to zero, yielding
 t =
 
I AT  1 ;
which implies that  i;t is constant for all i and t, and thus
d ln yi;t = d ln ci;t:
Combined with (C21), this yields (C10).
Part 2. The analysis until equation (C18) from part 1 still applies. This equation needs to
be modied, however, because of taxes to nance government spending. In particular, At = 0
now implies
ltwt   Tt = pi;tci;t
i
=
pj;tcj;t
j
(C23)
=
1
t
;
with the second line following from (C14). Combining (C16) with (C23), we obtain
lt =
1 + Tt
1 + 
t =
1 + 
1  Tt (C24)
Rt =
1  EtTt+1
 (1  Tt) ;
where the last equation of (C24) has expected taxes next period, because next periods govern-
ment spending shocks and thus taxes are unknown at time t. Since, by assumption, Et ~G = ~Gt
for all  > t, we also have EtTt+1 = Tt, and thus
Rt =

1  Et+1Tt+1
 (1  Tt)

=
1

: (C25)
Next multiplying the resource constraint, (C9), with pi;t to convert it into nominal terms
and substituting pi;tci;t =
i
t
(from (C23)), and using (C22), we have
~yi;t =
i
t
+
nX
j=1
aji
~yj;t+1
Rt
+ ~Gi;t 1;
where note that we write ~yi;t+1 instead of Et~yi;t+1, since there are no productivity shocks and
thus given the input choices at time t, ~yi;t+1 is known at time t. Substituting for t from (C24)
and for Rt from (C25), and writing it in matrix notation, we have
~yt = gt 1+AT~yt+1 + ~Gt 1; (C26)
where gt  1 
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj;t
1+ . Writing the same equation at future dates and taking expectations
at time t, we have
~yt+1 = gt+A
T~yt+2 + ~Gt;
and
Et~yt+k = Etgt+k 1+ATEt~yt+k+1 + Et ~Gt+k 1:
Substituting these terms forward, we obtain
~yt = gt 1 + ~Gt 1+A
T

Etgt + Et ~Gt

+2
 
AT
2Etgt+1 + Et ~Gt+1+: : :+K  ATK Et~yt+K :
Using the fact that K
 
AT
K ! 0 as K !1 (again because As largest eigenvalues less than
one in absolute value) and that Et ~G = ~Gt for all  > t, and leading by one period, we have
~yt+1 = gt + ~Gt + A
T

gt + ~Gt

+ 2
 
AT
2 
gt + ~Gt

+ : : : :
Finally, di¤erentiating, we obtain
d~yt+1 = dgt + d ~Gt + 

AT(dgt + d ~Gt

+ 2(
 
AT
2
(dgt + d ~Gt)+:::
=
 
I  AT 1  Pnj=1 d ~Gj;t
1 + 
 + d ~Gt
!
;
verifying (C11).
There are three important features to emphasize. First, despite the intertemporal nature
of the linkages, the equilibrium still takes a simple form, with many of the same features as the
ones that emerged in our static economy. Secondly, and relatedly, equilibrium dynamics in the
case of technology/productivity shocks, summarized in equation (C10), are particularly close
to the responses in the static model derived in the main text. Dynamics in the presence of
government spending shocks are a little more complicated, however, because in this dynamic
environment, changes in government spending a¤ect the interest rate and via this channel
sectoral prices (whereas in the static model prices remained constant in response to changes in
government spending). This complication notwithstanding, equation (C11) still takes relatively
simple form and shows how sectoral outputs evolve in response to changes in government
spending patterns (and we will see its close relationship to equation (7) in the text in the next
proposition). Finally, equilibrium dynamics now depend on the input-output matrix, A or A^,
and not on the Leontief inverse. This is because, given that one period delay in converting
inputs into output, indirect e¤ects take place over time. Consequently, for tracing the e¤ect
of last periods output on todays output, which focuses on direct e¤ect, it is the input-output
matrix that is relevant. Nevertheless, because the indirect e¤ects now accumulate over time,
the long-run response to shocks is again given by the Leontief inverse as we show in the next
proposition.
Proposition C2 1. Consider a one-time productivity shock to industries, dzt (with dzt =
0 for all  > t). Then
d ln y1 = (I A) 1  dzt: (C27)
2. Consider a one-time government spending shock to industries at time t, d ~Gt (with d ~G =
0 for all  > t), and suppose that  ! 1. Then
d~yt+1 = H
T
 
 
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj;t
1 + 
 + d ~Gt
!
;
or in log form
d ln ~yt+1 = H^
Td ~Gt: (C28)
where t is the date-t version of the matrix dened in Appendix A equation (A8), given
in equation (C29) below.
Proof. Part 1. Take t = 0 for simplicity. Then, from equation (C10), we have
ln y0 = A ln y 1 + z0
ln y1 = A
2 ln y 1 + A z0 + z1
...
ln yK = A
K+1 ln y 1 + AKz0 + AK 1z1 + :::+ zK
Since dzt = 0 for all t > 0, zt = z0 for all t > 0; and thus
ln yK = A
K+1 ln y 1 + AKz0 + AK 1z0 + :::+ z0:
Di¤erentiating, we have
d ln yK =

AK + AK 1 + :::+ I

dz0:
As K !1, we obtain (C27).
Part 2. This result is obtained directly from (C11) by taking the limit  ! 1, which yields
d~yt+1 = H
0B@ d
~G1;t   11+
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj;t
d ~G2;t   11+
Pn
j=1 d
~Gj;t
...
1CA ;
verifying equation (A10) in Appendix A. Moreover, following the same steps as in Appendix
A (in particular, equation (A8)), we can equivalently write this in log form as follows:
d~yi;t+1 =
nX
j=1
hji
 
d ~Gj;t  
j
1 + 
nX
k=1
d ~Gk;t
!
for each i
d~yi;t+1
~yi;t+1
=
nX
j=1
h^ji
1
~yj;t
 
d ~Gj;t  
j
1 + 
nX
k=1
d ~Gk;t
!
;
and thus
d ln ~yt+1 = H^
Ttd ~Gt
where where
t =
0BBBBBBBB@

1  1(1+)

1
p1;ty1;t
  1(1+) 1p1;ty1;t :::
  2(1+) 1p2;ty2;t

1  2(1+)

1
p2;ty2;t
. . . 
1  n(1+)

1
pn;tyn;t
1CCCCCCCCA
; (C29)
thus yielding the desired result.
The most noteworthy results in this proposition are the coincidence of equations (C27) and
(C28) with (6) and (7) in the text. In particular, (C27) highlights that the long-run response to
a one-time (permanent) technology shock in this dynamic model is identical to the equilibrium
response to technology shocks in the static model given by (6). Equation (C28), on the other
hand, highlights that the dynamic response to a one-time (permanent) government spending
shock is identical to the equilibrium response to government shocks in the static model given
by (7) provided that the discount factor  is close enough to 1. These results underpin our
claims that our results and empirical strategy continue to be valid even if data are generated
by a dynamic model in which shocks spread across sectors over time.
Monte Carlo Evidence
We now use the results of the previous subsection as the basis of our Monte Carlo exercise. We
use the equations of the Long-Plosser model, (C10) and (C11), derived above to trace out the
dynamics of output in response to technology in government spending shocks. We also add an
additional error term to capture other sources of productivity and demand shocks (as well as
measurement error). In the case of technology shocks, equation (C10) thus becomes
technology shocks : d ln yt = A d ln yt 1 + ztfpt + tfpt (C30)
where ztfpt denotes the vector of technology shocks, and 
tfp
t is the vector of additional shocks
assumed to be iid. We take productivity and government spending shocks to be persistent
(since we are considering short time periods, such as months or quarters, which will then be
time averaged into annual observations). In particular, we assume that
ztfpi;t = z
tfp
i;t 1 + t;
where t  N (0; 1). When time periods correspond to quarters, we set  = 0:85; which implies
an annual persistence of 0:52, corresponding approximately to the average persistence of the
shocks we study in our empirical work.
For equation (C11), we approximate Rt ' 1= ' 1, since time periods are taken to be short
(quarters or months), and then use the same steps as in the proof of Proposition C2 to convert
the equation in nominal terms into log changes and thus write (C11) as
d ln yt+1 = H^
Ttd ~Gt;
where
t =
0BBBBBBBB@

1  1(1+)

1
p1;ty1;t
  1(1+) 1p1;ty1;t :::
  2(1+) 1p2;ty2;t

1  2(1+)

1
p2;ty2;t
. . . 
1  n(1+)

1
pn;tyn;t
1CCCCCCCCA
:
Thus the equation we use to generate our simulated data the case of government spending
shocks is
government spending shocks : d ln yt = H^
Ttz
G
t + 
G
t ;
where zGt denotes the vector of government spending shocks, and 
G
t denotes the additional
shock in this case. We again take this latter shock to be iid, and impose the same persistence
structure on our shock of interest, i.e.,
zGi;t = z
G
i;t 1 + t:
We also assume that tfpt ; 
G
t are iid and distributed N (0; 10) so as to generate su¢ cient
noise in our simulated data. Throughout, we take the number of sectors to be 392 as in our
empirical work, and we use the actual input-output matrices from the U.S. data that featured
in our empirical work.
For quarterly data, we burn the rst 160 quarters of simulated data, and then take 20
years of quarterly data, which we then time-average into annual observations, thus giving us
20 years of annual data with 392 sectors, which matches our empirical frame. We repeat this
procedure 1000 times.
We then estimate our main specication from the text, equation (12), on these simulated
datasets. As in our main text, upstream and downstream e¤ects are computed from equa-
tions (13) and (14). The following regression equation reports mean values and the standard
deviation of the estimates across the 1000 runs, starting with the case of technology shocks:
d ln yt =  0:002
(0:012)
 d ln yt 1 + 0:770
(0:037)
 dztfpt 1 + 0:014
(0:206)
 dztfp;upt 1 + 0:881
(0:327)
 dztfp;downt 1 :
Panels A-D of Appendix Figure 4 illustrate the distributions of each coe¢ cient across these
1000 simulations. Both our summary equation and the gure clearly show that we estimate
no upstream e¤ect and signicant downstream e¤ects as predicted by theory. The coe¢ cient
on the lagged dependent variable is zero, reecting the fact that there is no other source of
persistence (such as capital accumulation) in our simulated data. Panel E of the gure turns
to the implied tests of the theoretical restriction (where we again follow the theory and include
all indirect e¤ects from own shocks together with the own shock). It plots the distribution of
p values of the test for this theory-implied restriction. We see that this restriction is rejected
in about 18% of the cases at the 5% level. This somewhat high rejection rate is a consequence
of the fact that time averaging the simulated data a¤ects the own and downstream e¤ects
di¤erentially. Nevertheless, we nd it encouraging that in the great majority of the cases, this
restriction is not rejected.
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Appendix Figure 4. Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates and p-values for coe¢ cient equality tests
from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in response to technology shocks at quarterly frequency.
The next equation summarizes the results from government spending shocks, with the full
results shown in Appendix Figure 5. The overall pattern is very similar and again consistent
with our theoretical predictions, with one notable di¤erence that, in this case, despite time-
averaging the theory-implied restriction between own and network e¤ects is rejected in about
4% of the cases at the 5% level, approximately as we would expect.
d ln yt =  0:012
(0:011)
 d ln yt 1 + 0:781
(0:034)
 dzGt 1 + 0:761
(0:182)
 dzG;upt 1   0:008
(0:221)
 dzG;downt 1 :
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Appendix Figure 5. Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates and p-values for coe¢ cient equality tests
from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in response to government spending shocks at quarterly frequency.
We next depict the same analysis when simulating the model at the monthly frequency,
which in particular implies that we set month = 0:947, so that we have the same annual
persistence of shocks. We now use 1000 runs of 20 years each, and again burned the equivalent
of 20 years of data (480 months). The results for technology shocks are once again similar, as
summarized in the next equation and in Appendix Figure 6 below.
d ln yt =  0:031
(0:014)
 d ln yt 1 + 0:730
(0:022)
 dztfpt 1 + 0:002
(0:092)
 dztfp;upt 1 + 0:769
(0:133)
 dztfp;downt 1 :
based on
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Appendix Figure 6. Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates and p-values for coe¢ cient equality tests
from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in response to technology shocks at monthly frequency.
Once again, in response to technology shocks, there are no upstream e¤ects and well-
estimated downstream e¤ects, and theory-implied restrictions are accepted in the majority of
the cases.
Turning next to government spending shocks, we nd a similar pattern consistent with
theory as summarized in the next equation and in Appendix Figure 7:
d ln yt =  0:035
(0:014)
 d ln yt 1 + 0:734
(0:020)
 dzGt 1 + 0:711
(0:089)
 dzG;upt 1   0:0003
(0:098)
 dzG;downt 1 :
-0.1 0 0.1
0
100
200
300
A. D lnY(t-1)
0.7 0.8
0
100
200
300
B. D Z(t-1)
0 1 2
0
100
200
300
C. Upstream(t-1)
-0.5 0 0.5
0
100
200
300
D. Downstream(t-1)
0 0.5 1
0
20
40
60
80
E. P-value of Equality Test
Appendix Figure 7. Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates and p-values for coe¢ cient equality tests
from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in response to government spending shocks at monthly frequency.
Measurement Error
Our second Monte Carlo exercise investigates whether measurement error in the input-output
matrix will lead to incorrect inference (partly because this measurement error might be magni-
ed in the Leontief inverse). For this exercise, we directly simulate data at the annual frequency
from our baseline model (thus using the Leontief inverse matrices), and since we would like
to investigate whether, in the presence of measurement error, network e¤ects from technology
shocks might be incorrectly identied as resulting from government shocks and vice versa, we
combine (C10) and (C11) and simulate the data in the presence of both types of shocks pro-
creating according to theory as well as additional noise representing other shocks. Namely, we
use the equation
d ln yt+1 =   d ln yt + down H dztfpt + up  H^t  dz
G
t + t; (C31)
where dztfpt and dz
G
t are the vectors of technology and government spending shocks, and we
take them to be iid and distributed N (0; 1). The additional noise t is assume to be distributed
N (0; 1=12) : We set  to the average of its empirical estimates, 0.085, and we again use the
Leontief inverse matrices H and H^ from the data as in our empirical work. To investigate
whether positive downstream (upstream) e¤ects will be correctly identied and whether we
will also be able to estimate precisely zero e¤ects when such propagation is absent, we consider
four di¤erent scenarios for up and down: (i) up = 1; down = 1; (ii) up = 1; down = 0;
(iii) up = 0; down = 1, and (iv) up = 0; down = 0, covering all four possibilities (where
the normalization of the positive e¤ects to 1 is without loss of any generality). We again run
1000 simulations in each case.
In estimating our main empirical model, equation (12), we introduce randomly-generated
measurement error on the actual matrix, so that the matrix we use in the estimation becomes
A =
0BBBBB@
a11 + 11 a12 + 12 :::
a21 + 21 a22 + 22
. . .
ann + nn
1CCCCCA
and A^ is constructed analogously. To make this demanding test of our empirical strategy,
we introduce a considerable amount of measurement error and set the standard deviation of 
equal to the average entry of the input-output matrix, a  1
n2
X
i
X
j
aij . That is,
ij ; ^ijN (0; a) ;
and di¤erent draws are independent. With this amount of measurement error, the ranking of
the entries of the input-output matrices can be considerably di¤erent than what we measure.
We then compute the Leontief inverses in the usual manner: H = (I A) 1 and H^ =
I  A^T
 1
. We again estimate equation (12) computing the downstream and upstream
e¤ects according to equations (13) and (14).
We next report the results of this exercise, starting with the benchmark of no measurement
error when there are both upstream and downstream e¤ects, and then moving to the four cases
indicated above. Throughout, given our motivation explained above, we estimate network
e¤ects from technology and government spending shocks simultaneously.2
Case 0, No Measurement Error, up = 1; down = 1
In this case, both own e¤ects and network e¤ects are precisely estimated, and are consistent
with theory. In particular, we nd downstream propagation of technology shocks and zero
upstream propagation of these shocks, and upstream propagation but no downstream propa-
gation of government spending shocks. Quantitatively, own shocks and the relevant network
e¤ects are of the same magnitude as predicted by theory. These results are summarized in the
next equation.
dln yt+1 =
8<:
0:085
(0:006)
 dln yt   0:003
(0:054)
 ztfp;upt + 1:002
(0:065)
 ztfp;downt + 1:000
(0:010)
 ztfp;ownt
+0:980
(0:055)
 zG;upt   0:004
(0:064)
 zG;downt + 1:000
(0:010)
 zG;ownt
9=; :
(C32)
2The results are similar if the two types of network e¤ects are estimated separately.
Case 1, Measurement Error, up = 1; down = 1
In this case, as shown by the next summary equation, we nd the expected pattern of down-
stream propagation of technology shocks and upstream propagation of government spending
shocks, and no upstream propagation from technology shocks and no downstream propagation
from government spending shocks. Moreover, despite the sizable amount of measurement er-
ror in the input-output matrices, the estimated magnitudes of the relevant network e¤ects are
consistent with theory: on average, downstream network e¤ects from technology shocks have
the same magnitude as the own e¤ect of technology shocks, and upstream network e¤ects from
government spending shocks likewise have the same magnitude as the own e¤ect of government
spending shocks.
dln yt+1 =
8<:
0:085
(0:006)
 dln yt   0:001
(0:054)
 ztfp;upt + 0:992
(0:063)
 ztfp;downt + 1:000
(0:011)
 ztfp;ownt
+0:970
(0:053)
 zG;upt   0:002
(0:061)
 zG;downt + 1:000
(0:010)
 zG;ownt
9=; :
The full distribution of the parameter estimates, focusing on upstream e¤ect, downstream
e¤ects and own e¤ects, are shown in Appendix Figure 8.
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Appendix Figure 8.
Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in response to
technology and government spending shocks with measurement error and up = 1 and down = 1.
In summary, in this case, with both government spending and technology shocks, despite the
substantial amount of measurement error, our regressions correctly identify the theory-implied
network e¤ects and estimate zero propagation when there should not be any.
Case 2, Measurement Error, up = 1; down = 0
We next turn to the (hypothetical) case in which the data generating process includes upstream
propagation in response to government spending shocks, but no downstream propagation in
response to technology shocks.3 The results are again encouraging for our empirical strategy
as summarized by the next equation and Appendix Figure 9, and show that our regressions
estimate the relevant network e¤ects correctly and estimate zero e¤ects when there are no
network e¤ects.
dln yt+1 =
8<:
0:085
(0:006)
 dln yt + 0:001
(0:052)
 ztfp;upt   0:001
(0:066)
 ztfp;downt + 0:000
(0:010)
 ztfp;ownt
+0:974
(0:056)
 zG;upt   0:005
(0:063)
 zG;downt + 1:000
(0:010)
 zG;ownt
9=; :
3This case is not possible when our theory applies, since upstream propagation in response to government
spending shocks and downstream propagation in response to technology shocks are determined by the same
input-output linkages. Nevertheless, this hypothetical case enables us to investigate whether our regressions
will correctly identify the presence or the absence of these e¤ects when one is present and the other one is not
as might be the case under alternative theories.
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Appendix Figure 9. Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates from 1000 Monte Carlo simulationsin
response to government spending shocks with measurement error and up = 1 and down = 0.
The results show zero own e¤ects and zero network e¤ects from technology shocks, and
zero downstream propagation from government spending shocks, and correctly identify the own
e¤ects and upstream propagation from government spending shocks, with the right magnitudes.
Case 3, Measurement Error, up = 0; down = 1
We nd the same pattern when there is downstream propagation in response to technology
shocks but no upstream propagation in response to government shocks as summarized next:
dln yt+1 =
8<:
0:085
(0:008)
 dln yt + 0:004
(0:052)
 ztfp;upt + 0:989
(0:062)
 ztfp;downt + 1:001
(0:011)
 ztfp;ownt
 0:003
(0:052)
 zG;upt   0:002
(0:061)
 zG;downt + 0:000
(0:010)
 zG;ownt
9=; :
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Appendix Figure 10.
Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in response to
technology and government spending shocks with measurement error and up = 0 and down = 1.
Case 4, up = 0; down = 0
Finally, we turn to the case in which there are no network e¤ects, and in this case our equations,
as summarized next, correctly identify no upstream or downstream propagation in response to
either government spending or technology shocks (as well as no own e¤ects).
dln yt+1 =
8<:
0:085
(0:011)
 dln yt + 0:000
(0:052)
 ztfp;upt + 0:002
(0:062)
 ztfp;downt + 0:000
(0:010)
 ztfp;ownt
 0:001
(0:053)
 zG;upt + 0:000
(0:064)
 zG;downt + 0:000
(0:010)
 zG;ownt
9=; :
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Appendix Figure 11.
Distribution of coe¢ cient estimates from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in response to
technology and government spending shocks with measurement error and up = 0 and down = 0.
Overall, these results bolster our condence in the reliability of our empirical strategy, even
in the presence of substantial measurement error.
